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INVESTMENT INDISCIPLINE: A 
BEHAVIORAL APPROACH TO 
MUTUAL FUND JURISPRUDENCE 
William A. Birdthistle* 
This Term, in Jones v. Harris Associates L.P., the Supreme 
Court will have the opportunity to resolve doctrinal, econometric, and 
philosophical divergences over a profoundly important financial sys-
tem: the investment industry through which almost one hundred mil-
lion Americans attempt to save more than ten trillion dollars for their 
retirement.  When this case was before the Seventh Circuit, two of the 
foremost theorists of law and economics, Chief Judge Frank Easter-
brook and Judge Richard Posner, disagreed vociferously on compet-
ing analyses of this industry.  The Supreme Court’s opinion in this 
case should not only resolve the intricate doctrinal fiduciary issues of 
the dispute but also have important implications for several major 
theoretical debates in contemporary American jurisprudence: the 
permissible constraints—if any—upon determinations of executive 
compensation; the judicial capacity to evaluate increasingly sophisti-
cated econometric analyses of financial systems; and the growing ten-
sion between neoclassical and behavioral economics. 
Professor Birdthistle advances a positive account of the econom-
ic and legal context of this dispute and argues normatively for a beha-
vioral approach to its resolution.  Because of the unique structure and 
history of the personal investment industry in the United States, the 
architecture of this segment of the economy is singularly unprotected 
by beneficial market forces and exhibits significant competitive weak-
nesses such as broad price dispersion and a negative correlation be-
tween fees and performance.  The ultimate judicial resolution of this 
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Baker, Jim Cox, Tamar Frankel, Sarah Harding, Todd Henderson, Richard Holden, Lyman Johnson, 
Hal Krent, Jonathan Masur, Tom Miles, Larry Ribstein, as well as the participants in workshops at 
Boston College School of Law, the University of Illinois College of Law, Southern Methodist Univer-
sity Dedman School of Law, and Chicago-Kent College of Law for their helpful comments and in-
sights.  I am also grateful to Lucy Moss, Benjamin Wilensky, and Matthew Wheeler for their excellent 
research assistance.  Versions of the arguments in this Article have appeared in my blog postings and 
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ciates L.P., 527 F.3d 627 (7th Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 1579 (2009) (No. 08-586), which I au-
thored. 
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dispute should take account of the behavioral constraints upon indi-
vidual investors and their advisors to avoid nullifying congressional 
action and to impose discipline in a vital segment of the U.S. econo-
my. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Federal judges cannot—within the bounds of judicial etiquette—call 
upon the Supreme Court to overturn the ruling of a colleague.  But they 
certainly can attract the Justices’ attention.  And when Judge Richard 
Posner published a passionate critique of a fellow jurist’s opinion in 
which he emphasized “the creation of a circuit split, the importance of 
the issue . . . and the one-sided character of the panel’s analysis,”1 he 
came as close to demanding reversal as one is ever likely to read in the 
Federal Reporter.  Posner’s displeasure was particularly remarkable be-
cause the author whose “economic analysis” he found “ripe for reexami-
nation”2 was none other than Chief Judge Frank Easterbrook.  So public 
a contretemps between two such renowned jurists may well explain why 
the Supreme Court answered Posner’s call by granting certiorari3 in what 
has become a remarkably well-timed case whose central quarrel concerns 
 
 1. Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 537 F.3d 728, 732–33 (7th Cir. 2008) (Posner, J., dissenting from 
denial of rehearing en banc). 
 2. Id. at 730. 
 3. See Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 129 S. Ct. 1579, 1580 (2009). 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1412878
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the degree to which the judiciary may, or indeed must, defer to fallible 
market forces.  With the involvement of the Supreme Court, what de-
buted as an important appellate case now appears destined for a perma-
nent pedestal within the canon of corporate law. 
For decades, Easterbrook and Posner have collaborated famously4 
on a likeminded exposition of the economic analysis of law in their roles 
both as brethren on the Seventh Circuit5 and as fellow faculty members 
at the University of Chicago Law School.6  Precisely because of this phil-
osophical kinship, some of their most notable scholarly contributions 
have emerged from their public disagreements—such as their dueling 
opinions in Jordan v. Duff & Phelps, Inc.7—which now anchor the corpo-
rate law curriculum.8 
So when, in Jones v. Harris Associates L.P., Posner published a cut-
ting dissent to the denial of rehearing Easterbrook’s opinion en banc,9 
scholars, practitioners, and regulators inclined closely to attend to the 
dispute that estranged these erstwhile intellectual allies10 and attracted 
the interest of the Supreme Court.11  Indeed, academic authors have al-
ready excerpted the 2008 appellate decision in corporate and securities 
 
 4. See Floyd Norris, Judges in Dispute Over Mutual Funds, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2008, at C3 
(“They are both known as conservatives and were pioneers in the economic analysis of the law.  Each 
is a past president of the American Law and Economics Association. . . . A 2001 poll of Legal Affairs 
Magazine readers listed them among the 20 most influential legal thinkers in the country.  Only one 
other circuit court judge made the list.”).  Both have also been chosen to write the foreword to the 
Supreme Court issue of the Harvard Law Review.  Frank H. Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, 1983 
Term—Foreword: The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1984); Richard A. Posn-
er, The Supreme Court, 2004 Term—Foreword: A Political Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 31 (2005).  
 5. See Norris, supra note 4; see also Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Choosing the Next Su-
preme Court Justice: An Empirical Ranking of Judge Performance, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 23, 44–50 (2004) 
(presenting empirical data that rank Judges Posner and Easterbrook as the first and second, respec-
tively, most prolific publishers and most cited authors of appellate judicial opinions published between 
1998 and 2000). 
 6. See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
CORPORATE LAW (1991); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (7th ed. 2007); Frank 
H. Easterbrook, William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Contribution Among Antitrust Defendants: 
A Legal and Economic Analysis, 23 J.L. & ECON. 331 (1980). 
 7. 815 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1987). 
 8. See, e.g., WILLIAM A. KLEIN, J. MARK RAMSEYER & STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, BUSINESS 
ASSOCIATIONS 628–39 (7th ed. 2009) (excerpting Jordan v. Duff & Phelps, Inc.). 
 9. 537 F.3d 728 (7th Cir. 2008). 
 10. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors in Support of the Issuance of a Writ of Cer-
tiorari, Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 129 S. Ct. 1579 (2009) (No. 08-586) [hereinafter Brief of Amici 
Curiae Law Professors] (setting forth the argument of fifteen legal scholars of federal securities regula-
tion, business organizations, and the law of investment funds).  In addition to law firms publishing sev-
eral client alerts immediately following the publication of Posner’s dissent, the Securities and Ex-
change Chairman, Mary L. Schapiro, recently stated that she “expect[s] that the SEC will voice its 
views [in this case] through the amicus process.”  Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n, Address to Mutual Fund Directors Forum Ninth Annual Policy Conference: Critical Issues 
for Investment Company Directors (May 4, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/ 
2009/spch050409mls.htm. 
 11. Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 527 F.3d 627 (7th Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 1579 (2009). 
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law casebooks.12  No doubt the Supreme Court opinion will command 
even greater attention, scrutiny, and textbook pages. 
At the heart of the matter lies a philosophical divergence between 
Easterbrook and Posner over a profoundly important financial system: 
the investment industry through which almost one hundred million 
Americans attempt to save more than ten trillion dollars for their retire-
ment.13  The Supreme Court’s ruling should not only resolve the intricate 
fiduciary and doctrinal issues of this dispute but also have profound im-
plications for several major theoretical debates in contemporary Ameri-
can jurisprudence: the permissible constraints—if any—upon determina-
tions of executive compensation; the judicial capacity to evaluate 
increasingly sophisticated econometric analyses of financial systems; and 
the growing tension between neoclassical and behavioral economics. 
The specific issue in Jones is whether an investment advisor 
breached its congressionally imposed fiduciary duty to investors by 
charging excessive fees to manage those investors’ savings.14  With nine-
ty-two million Americans investing more than ten trillion dollars in re-
tirement and investment funds15 and paying almost one hundred billion 
dollars a year in fees to do so,16 the practical implications of this decision 
are going to be enormous and will reach directly into American house-
holds.  The Supreme Court’s ruling could save investors—or, alternative-
ly, reward investment advisors—tens of billions of dollars a year in ex-
penses and even greater amounts in future compounded returns.  Few 
judicial disputes possess the potential for such a direct pecuniary impact 
upon such a massive swath of ordinary citizens.  Fewer still demand the 
attention of the nation’s highest court at a historic moment in the imme-
diate aftermath of systemic financial crisis. 
In this Article, I advance a positive account of the economic and le-
gal context of this dispute and then argue normatively for a behavioral 
approach to its resolution.  Because of the unique structure and history 
of the personal investment industry in the United States, the architecture 
of this segment of the economy is singularly unprotected by beneficial 
market forces and exhibits significant competitive weakness such as 
broad price dispersion17 and a negative correlation between fees and per-
 
 12. See, e.g., KLEIN, RAMSEYER & BAINBRIDGE, supra note 8, at 392–95 (excerpting Jones v. 
Harris Associates L.P.). 
 13. See INV. CO. INST., 2008 FACT BOOK 7–8 (48th ed. 2008), http://www.icifactbook.org/ 
pdf/2008_factbook.pdf; Schapiro, supra note 10.   
 14. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) (2006) (stating, in pertinent part, that an “investment adviser of a regis-
tered investment company shall be deemed to have a fiduciary duty with respect to the receipt of com-
pensation for services”); Jones, 527 F.3d at 630. 
 15. See INV. CO. INST., supra note 13, at 7–8; Schapiro, supra note 10.  
 16. See, e.g., Paul G. Mahoney, Manager-Investor Conflicts in Mutual Funds, 18 J. ECON. PERSP. 
161, 166–68 (2004) (computing the total cost that investors pay to invest through mutual funds). 
 17. See PETER J. WALLISON & ROBERT E. LITAN, COMPETITIVE EQUITY: A BETTER WAY TO 
ORGANIZE MUTUAL FUNDS 8–11 (2007). 
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formance.18  The ultimate judicial resolution of this dispute must take full 
account of the behavioral constraints upon individual investors and their 
advisors to avoid nullifying congressional action with an unexamined 
embrace of deregulation from the bench. 
As a liminal matter, the anatomy of the investment fund industry 
lacks several important mechanisms that ensure effective corporate go-
vernance.19  Unlike typical operating companies, mutual funds enjoy no 
market for corporate control, no conflict-assuaging system of managerial 
compensation, and no capacity for discipline by short selling.20  Indeed, a 
1970 Senate report accompanying the implementation of the fiduciary 
duty designed to compensate for these structural voids expressly de-
scribed the relationship between investment advisors and their mutual 
funds as uncompetitive.21 
Uncritical assumptions about the efficacy of deregulatory fiduciary 
protections via a judicial ruling are particularly ill-timed in an industry 
that has recently been accused of widespread violations of trust.22  In 
2003, state and federal regulators unleashed scores of investigations of 
investment advisors whom they accused of mismanaging clients’ funds.  
Those efforts, which continue to this day, recouped billions of dollars in 
settlement fees.23  During the recent market decline, investors with peri-
lously undiversified and poorly allocated investment portfolios lost more 
than $2.5 trillion from their retirement funds.24 
 
 18. See Javier Gil-Bazo & Pablo Ruiz-Verdú, The Relation Between Price and Performance in the 
Mutual Fund Industry, 64 J. FIN. 2153, 2178–79 (2009); see also Mark M. Carhart, On Persistence in 
Mutual Fund Performance, 52 J. FIN. 57, 80 (1997); Burton G. Malkiel, Returns from Investing in Equi-
ty Mutual Funds 1971 to 1991, 50 J. FIN. 549, 570–72 (1995). 
 19. See Donald C. Langevoort, Private Litigation to Enforce Fiduciary Duties in Mutual Funds: 
Derivative Suits, Disinterested Directors and the Ideology of Investor Sovereignty, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 
1017, 1030–32 (2005). 
 20. Id. 
 21. S. REP. NO. 91-184, at 5 (1969), as reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4897, 4901. 
 22. See generally William A. Birdthistle, Compensating Power: An Analysis of Rents and Re-
wards in the Mutual Fund Industry, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1401 (2006) [hereinafter Birdthistle, Compensat-
ing Power]; William A. Birdthistle, The Fortunes and Foibles of Exchange-Traded Funds: A Positive 
Market Response to the Problems of Mutual Funds, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 69 (2008) [hereinafter Birdthis-
tle, Fortunes and Foibles]; Stephen Choi & Marcel Kahan, The Market Penalty for Mutual Fund Scan-
dals, 87 B.U. L. REV. 1021 (2007); James D. Cox & John W. Payne, Mutual Fund Expense Disclosures: 
A Behavioral Perspective, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 907 (2005); Tamar Frankel, How Did We Get Into This 
Mess?, 1 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 133 (2006); Tamar Frankel & Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Mysterious 
Ways of Mutual Funds: Market Timing, 25 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 235 (2006). 
 23. Many of the best known investment advisors in the retirement savings industry have paid 
eight- and nine-figure settlements over the past five years, including Bank of America ($675 million), 
Bear Stearns ($250 million), Putnam Investments, Massachusetts Financial Services ($225 million), 
Janus Capital Group ($225 million), Alliance Capital Management ($600 million), Pilgrim Baxter 
($100 million), and many others.  See, e.g., Greg Farrell, Bear Stearns to Pay $250M, USA TODAY, 
Mar. 17, 2006, at 2B; Josh Friedman, FleetBoston, BofA to Pay $675 Million, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 16, 
2004, at C1; Tom Lauricella, Alliance Offers to Cut Fees 20%, WALL ST. J., Dec. 16, 2003, at C1. 
 24. Investment Company Institute, Trends in Mutual Fund Investing, December 2008, 
http://www.ici.org/pressroom/news/trends_12_08 (last visited Dec. 1, 2009) (showing a one-year decline 
in mutual fund assets from approximately $12 trillion to $9.6 trillion); Schapiro, supra note 10. 
 
66 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2010 
To summarize, in portions of the U.S. retirement savings industry, 
the professionally incompetent appear to have overcharged the financial-
ly unsophisticated. 
The Easterbrook-Posner debate encapsulated in Jones provides an 
excellent and timely opportunity to conduct a comprehensive theoretical 
and doctrinal evaluation of the judicial contours of the U.S. savings in-
dustry.  The case brings into conflict two of the leading economic and le-
gal theories of our day.  Easterbrook’s panel opinion represents a neo-
classical law-and-economics analysis that presumes a well-functioning 
market for investment advice, discounts possibly irrational investor be-
havior, and concludes with a call for deregulation of the industry.25  Posn-
er responded in his dissent with a behavioralist approach that focuses on 
market weaknesses, calls attention to systemic distortions of incentives, 
and implicitly countenances a role for salutary intervention.26 
During the few months between the publication of these two opin-
ions, Americans witnessed the dramatic collapse of certain financial in-
struments27 and developed a concomitant increase in skepticism of eco-
nomic theories emphasizing deregulation.28  The stress that recent market 
problems have placed upon such legal theories prompted certain scholars 
to inquire whether we are witnessing what Brian Tamanaha has called 
“the receding tide of law and economics.”29   
While such a requiem is surely premature, recent events have ener-
gized the field of behavioral economics, which attempts to take account 
of the “predictably irrational”30 ways in which market participants often 
behave.31  In Jones, the Supreme Court will enjoy the ideal judicial op-
portunity to opine upon these dueling strains of economic analysis by 
endorsing one or the other as a mode for deciding whether the market 
 
 25. See Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 527 F.3d 627, 631–35 (7th Cir. 2008). 
 26. See Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 537 F.3d 728, 731–33 (7th Cir. 2008) (Posner, J., dissenting 
from denial of rehearing en banc). 
 27. See, e.g., Frank Partnoy & David A. Skeel, Jr., The Promise and Perils of Credit Derivatives, 
75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1019, 1019 (2007) (initiating “an in-depth analysis” of credit default swaps and col-
lateralized debt obligations); Paul M. Jonna, Comment, In Search of Market Discipline: The Case for 
Indirect Hedge Fund Regulation, 45 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 989, 1001 (2008). 
 28. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM xii–xiv (2009). 
 29. Posting of Brian Tamanaha to Balkinization, http://balkin.blogspot.com/2008/12/are-we-
witnessing-receding-tide-of-law.html (Dec. 17, 2008, 10:22 EST) (“Recent events appear to have ge-
nuinely shaken Posner’s faith in the self-correcting power of the market.”); see also Scott A. Moss & 
Peter H. Huang, How the New Economics Can Improve Employment Discrimination Law, and How 
Economics Can Survive the Demise of the “Rational Actor,” 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 183, 254–58 
(2009). 
 30. See DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL: THE HIDDEN FORCES THAT SHAPE OUR 
DECISIONS xx (2008). 
 31. See generally David Hirshleifer, The Blind Leading the Blind: Social Influence, Fads, and In-
formational Cascades, in THE NEW ECONOMICS OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR 188 (Mariano Tommasi & 
Kathryn Ierulli eds., 1995); Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 199 (2006); Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, Cultural Cognition and Public Policy, 24 YALE 
L. & POL’Y REV. 149 (2006); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Introduction to JUDGMENT UNDER 
UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 3 (Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky eds., 
1982). 
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alone can satisfy the fiduciary obligations imposed upon financial advi-
sors in their management of investors’ monies.  In light of the remark-
able recent market events, the timing of this litigation could not be more 
fortuitous for examining the assumptions and bases of economic legal 
analysis. 
As a preview, and perhaps a harbinger, for the Supreme Court, the 
Eighth Circuit recently handed down a notable opinion that grasped this 
timely opportunity.32  In the first judicial ruling upon the question of ex-
cessive fees since the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Jones, the 
Eighth Circuit expressly disagreed with Easterbrook’s reasoning, en-
dorsed Posner’s argument, and provided what I argue should serve as a 
template for the Supreme Court’s ultimate decision in Jones.33  In Gallus 
v. Ameriprise Financial, Inc., a case with facts materially identical to 
those in Jones, the Eighth Circuit chose not to stay its decision pending 
Jones but instead decided to make itself heard in this debate by issuing 
the first-ever decision in favor of a plaintiff in an excessive fees case.34  
The Gallus opinion demonstrates that the judiciary has begun to balance 
unbounded deregulatory measures by adopting broader academic theo-
ries that call into doubt certain assumptions about the rationality of in-
vestors.35 
One approach the courts have begun to consider follows the beha-
vioral theory of Cass Sunstein, who has suggested that real-world ob-
stacles to rational investment decisions may compel a departure from a 
strict laissez-faire notion in favor of mild “libertarian paternalism” to 
achieve socially beneficial outcomes.36  Congress recently enacted a very 
modest example of such a “nudge” in investment policy when—by relax-
ing pension regulations—it changed the default in savings accounts from 
requiring uninvested retirement contributions to be held in cash to per-
mitting those funds to be invested in broad-based, low-cost funds.37  Such 
a behavioral approach may thus afford protection to real-world investors 
who have neither the time nor the expertise to make the prudent invest-
ment decisions assumed of them by the rational actor model of neoclas-
sical law and economics.  Courts, too, can improve the savings industry 
 
 32. See Gallus v. Ameriprise Fin., Inc., 561 F.3d 816, 822 (8th Cir. 2009). 
 33. See id. at 822–23. 
 34. See Sam Mamudi, Ruling Over Fees Raises the Stakes, WALL ST. J., Apr. 16, 2009, at C9 (cit-
ing Professor James Cox for the proposition that “the Eighth Circuit’s ruling against Ameriprise is the 
first time a federal court has taken the side of investors in a fees case”).  
 35. See, e.g., Franklin Foer & Noam Scheiber, Nudge-ocracy: Barack Obama’s New Theory of 
the State, NEW REPUBLIC, May 6, 2009, at 22, 23–24; Ryan Lizza, Money Talks, NEW YORKER, May 4, 
2009, at 51, 53 (“Orszag has turned the O.M.B. into something of a behavioral-economics think 
tank.”). 
 36. See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT 
HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 5–6, 104 (2008); see also Gregory Mitchell, Libertarian Paternal-
ism Is an Oxymoron, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1245, 1245–46 (2005); Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, 
Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159, 1159–62 (2003). 
 37. See Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, § 624, 120 Stat. 780, 980 (codified at 
29 U.S.C. § 1104(c) (2006)). 
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by adopting a jurisprudential regime that takes greater and more reason-
able account of the actual constraints on rational investor behavior as 
well as the painfully learned lessons borne of an uncurious reverence for 
deregulation. 
In Part I of this Article, I discuss structural limitations unique to the 
savings industry, the resulting disproportionate reliance upon exit in this 
context, and the ways in which foibles of both investment advisors and 
investors undermine the efficacy of exit as a solitary bulwark for effective 
governance in these investment funds.   
In Part II, I examine the competing doctrinal approaches of the ap-
pellate opinions in Jones and Gallus as modes for explicating the dueling 
theories that currently dominate corporate and securities regulation 
broadly and the retirement savings field more specifically. 
In Part III, I advance a new, behavioral approach for resolving the 
current controversy.  I also explore the practical and theoretical implica-
tions that may flow from the Supreme Court’s ruling in Jones, including 
the Court’s possible contributions to debates concerning the appropriate 
legal constraints—if any—upon executive compensation decisions, the 
judicial capacity to evaluate increasingly sophisticated econometric anal-
yses of financial systems, and the tension between neoclassical versus be-
havioral economic theories. 
I. THE STATE OF OUR SAVINGS 
After the dramatic decline of large and sophisticated sectors of the 
U.S. and global economies, assumptions that the investment industry 
nevertheless remains healthy and competitive warrant reexamination.38  
For courts that must evaluate claims that investment advisors have vi-
olated congressionally imposed fiduciary duties—such as section 36(b) of 
the Investment Company Act39—such a reexamination reveals the com-
plexity of the structure and governance of the investment industry. 
Although Chief Judge Easterbrook pointed to the sheer number of 
investment funds40 and the size of the industry as probative indicia of its 
 
 38. See, e.g., Troy A. Paredes, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks Before the Mutual 
Fund Directors Forum Ninth Annual Policy Conference (May 4, 2009), available at http://www.sec. 
gov/news/speech/2009/spch050409tap.htm (“It is hard to argue that the mutual fund industry, on the 
whole, has been anything but a success for investors and our capital markets more generally.”). 
 39. Investment Company Act of 1940 § 36(b), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) (2006). 
 40. See, e.g., Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 527 F.3d 627, 633 (7th Cir. 2008) (“Today thousands of 
mutual funds compete.  The pages of the Wall Street Journal teem with listings.”). 
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health,41 similar averments were recently made with respect to the resi-
dential lending industry and the market for credit derivatives.42   
Such unexamined assumptions are unhelpful in today’s economic 
climate, and they may be particularly inapposite to a retail investment 
industry that, first, is structurally different and far more vulnerable than 
business segments involving typical corporations and, second, has so re-
cently demonstrated such manifestly deleterious behavior on the part of 
its two most important constituencies: advisors and investors. 
A. Structure and Governance 
The primary vehicles through which U.S. investors save for retire-
ment are mutual funds, which as of 2009 hold more than ten trillion dol-
lars in shareholder assets.43  Any attempt to understand and assess the in-
vestment industry must begin with an appreciation for the substantial 
structural differences that exist between mutual funds and typical corpo-
rations.44  These dissimilarities produce material differences between the 
governance regimes of mutual funds and those of the more widely stu-
died and understood corporations.45  These architectural idiosyncrasies 
also explain why market forces alone may often be insufficient to guaran-
tee competitive advisory fees.46  Indeed, they were what motivated Con-
gress to revise the Investment Company Act in 1970 to impose a specific 
fiduciary duty on investment advisors as a means of safeguarding inves-
tors from artificially high fees.47 
The central protagonists in this field, the investment advisors, de-
termine the structure of mutual funds by the manner in which they or-
ganize their enterprise.48  Investment advisors are firms of portfolio man-
agers whose business model is to provide investment advice to pools of 
money—mutual funds—in exchange for a percentage of the assets of 
those pools.49  Initially, the advisors themselves create and incubate these 
funds, forming them as distinct legal entities, drafting and adopting their 
founding articles and bylaws, and seeding the funds’ initial investment 
 
 41. See, e.g., Hecker v. Deere & Co., 556 F.3d 575, 586 (7th Cir. 2009) (asserting that a set of mu-
tual funds “were also offered to investors in the general public, and so the expense ratios necessarily 
were set against the backdrop of market competition” (emphasis added)), reh’g denied, 569 F.3d 708 
(2009). 
 42. Robert Lenzer, Lessons Learned a Year After Lehman’s Demise, FORBES.COM, Aug. 21, 
2009, http://www.forbes.com/2009/08/21/bernanke-bailout-paulson-personal-finance-investing-ideas-
lehman-brothers.html. 
 43. See INV. CO. INST., supra note 13, at 9. 
 44. See generally Birdthistle, Compensating Power, supra note 22.  
 45. Id. at 1429–30. 
 46. Id. at 1439–46. 
 47. See Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors, supra note 10, at 4 (discussing Investment Com-
pany Amendments Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-547, 84 Stat. 1413). 
 48. See, e.g., id. at 2–5; INV. CO. INST., supra note 13, at 164–65; Birdthistle, Compensating Power, 
supra note 22, at 1419–20. 
 49. See Birdthistle, Compensating Power, supra note 22, at 1403 n.2, 1409–10. 
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capital.50  An important task at this nascent stage is the appointment of a 
fund’s board of trustees.  Because the investment advisor is the only in-
vestor and therefore the only shareholder in a fund at this time, it has 
complete authority to appoint whomever it wishes to the board.51 
The advisor’s fee—the percentage of assets that it will receive for its 
services as a fund’s external management—is set forth by contract in an 
investment advisory agreement.52  Obviously, the advisor represents its 
own interests in the negotiation of the advisory agreement; representing 
the fund’s interests is the board of trustees, whom the advisor has just 
appointed.  The Investment Company Act requires that the advisory 
agreement be entered into anew each year, so advisors and boards un-
dergo an annual “contract renewal process.”53  As an empirical matter, 
boards almost universally retain and renew advisory agreements with the 
investment advisors that founded their funds, and the termination of an 
advisor by a board is exceedingly rare.54  Once retained, an advisor pro-
vides the operational life-support system for its funds, providing them 
with substantially all of their business infrastructure and management.55  
Individual shareholders may invest in a mutual fund only after the advi-
sor has completed this construction process and opened the fund to pub-
lic investment.56 
This particularly intimate and dependent bond between a fund and 
its advisor, combined with a concern for abuses inherent in such a rela-
tionship, prompted Congress first to enact the Investment Company Act 
of 1940 and then to revise that law three decades later with the Invest-
ment Company Amendments Act of 1970.57  The Senate report accom-
panying the 1970 amendments included these observations: 
Because of the unique structure of this industry the relationship be-
tween mutual funds and their investment adviser is not the same as 
that usually existing between buyers and sellers or in conventional 
 
 50. See Alan R. Palmiter & Ahmed E. Taha, Star Creation: The Incubation of Mutual Funds, 62 
VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1487–88, 1497–98 (2009). 
 51. More specifically, “[t]he composition of the board must, however, comport with certain fed-
eral requirements.”  Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors, supra note 10, at 3 n.5; see also Birdthistle, 
Compensating Power, supra note 22, at 1422. 
 52. See Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 205(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-5(a)(1) (2006).  Rule 205-3 
of the Adviser’s Act, however, permits performance fees only if the investment advisor is entering into 
an agreement with a “qualified client.”  17 C.F.R. § 275.205-3(a) (2009).  For an excellent discussion of 
the regulatory limits and policy limitations of compensation in mutual funds, see Mahoney, supra note 
16, at 177–81. 
 53. This process is also referred to as the “15(c) process” (because of the relevant provision re-
quiring annual approval) or the “Gartenberg process” (because of the leading federal case relating to 
this procedure).  See Investment Company Act of 1940 § 15(c), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(c).  For a discussion 
of proposals for heightened enforcement of the duties of mutual fund directors, see Donna M. Nagy, 
Regulating the Mutual Fund Industry, 1 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 11, 41–43 (2006). 
 54. See Birdthistle, Compensating Power, supra note 22, at 1424. 
 55. See id. at 1423–24. 
 56. See Palmiter & Taha, supra note 50, at 1488–89. 
 57. Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-547, 84 Stat. 1413 (codified 
as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -64). 
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corporate relationships.  Since a typical fund is organized by its in-
vestment adviser which provides it with almost all management ser-
vices and because its shares are bought by investors who rely on 
that service, a mutual fund cannot, as a practical matter sever its re-
lationship with the adviser.  Therefore, the forces of arm’s-length 
bargaining do not work in the mutual fund industry in the same 
manner as they do in other sectors of the American economy.58 
Congress accordingly attempted to moderate the control that an advisor 
has over the contract renewal process and the setting of advisory fees.59  
Specifically, the 1970 addition of section 36(b) to the Investment Com-
pany Act was an effort to counterbalance the asymmetries of the advisor-
fund relationship.60  In section 36(b), Congress provided that “the in-
vestment adviser of a registered investment company [a mutual fund] 
shall be deemed to have a fiduciary duty with respect to the receipt of 
compensation for services.”61  To enforce this fiduciary duty, Congress 
provided fund shareholders with a private right of action for violations of 
the duty.62 
Standard accounts of effective governance in operating corporations 
typically describe and laud the cooperative efforts of a panoply of mu-
tually reinforcing mechanisms.63  That is to say, the combined force of ef-
ficient capital markets, stock options, markets for corporate control, 
short selling, and influential institutional investors, inter alia, is thought 
to impose a healthy discipline on agency costs by policing the way man-
agers operate corporations to maximize shareholder wealth.64  But, im-
portantly, the presence of such mechanisms, and therefore the applicabil-
ity of such theory, is vastly diminished in the world of mutual funds. 
As Donald Langevoort has pointed out, many of the most impor-
tant of these devices simply do not exist or do not operate effectively 
within the unusual structure of mutual funds: 
Because mutual funds are not traded in an organized market, arbi-
trage opportunities cannot work to keep prices in line with rational 
expectations.  Mutual fund prices are simply the product of net as-
set value at the time of purchase or redemption.  Insider compensa-
tion is largely based on assets as well, which creates the conflict ra-
ther than aligns insider-shareholder interests, and directors are 
typically paid all or mostly in cash.  Institutional shareholder voice 
does not exist in the fund area, and there is no external market for 
 
 58. S. REP. NO. 91-184, at 5 (1969), as reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4897, 4901. 
 59. John C. Coates IV, Reforming the Taxation and Regulation of Mutual Funds: A Compara-
tive Legal and Economic Analysis 31 (Dec. 30, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1311945. 
 60. See id. at 31–32. 
 61. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b). 
 62. See id. 
 63. See, e.g., JONATHAN R. MACEY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: PROMISES KEPT, PROMISES 
BROKEN 50 tbl.3.1 (2008). 
 64. See id. 
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corporate control at all because shareholders can only sell their 
shares back to the fund.65 
Langevoort concludes by objecting to judicial attempts to import and 
then to graft general corporate governance theory onto mutual funds 
without understanding the distinctive nature of funds.66  “Thinking about 
mutual funds by imagining them simply as a species of ‘corporations’ in a 
way that is directly informed by contemporary corporate law theory is 
completely misguided,” he argues.67 
Given the absence of the traditional array of corporate constraints, 
the solitary remaining governance mechanism with meaningful applica-
bility in the mutual fund context is shareholder exit.68  Theory would sug-
gest that investment advisors will be constrained from mismanaging mu-
tual funds (by, for instance, charging excessive advisory fees) through the 
disciplining effect of existing investors selling their shares or potential 
shareholders declining to invest when the advisor governs poorly (by, for 
instance, charging excessive advisory fees).  But shareholder exit is not 
only the sole meaningful governance mechanism in the mutual fund con-
text, it is also distinctly fragile in that setting.69 
With devices such as the market for corporate control, price arbi-
trage, and institutional shareholder voice, the prime movers are sophisti-
cated investors, whose actions provide collateral benefits to unsophisti-
cated investors.  The device of shareholder exit, on the other hand, does 
not allow unsophisticated investors to benefit indirectly from the actions 
of sophisticated institutional players unless both sophisticated and unso-
phisticated investors inhabit the same market segment.70  If they did in-
vest in the same products, then the actions of sufficient numbers of so-
phisticated investors working with sufficient amounts of investment 
capital could protect the interests of less sophisticated investors.  Advi-
 
 65. Langevoort, supra note 19, at 1031–32 (footnote omitted). 
 66. Id. at 1032. 
 67. Id. 
 68. The array of effective mechanisms that Jonathan Macey catalogs also includes initial public 
offerings (IPOs) as a governance measure.  See MACEY, supra note 63, at 127–29.  In the corporate 
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investment banks.  See Jennifer S. Taub, Able but Not Willing: The Failure of Mutual Fund Advisors to 
Advocate for Shareholders’ Rights, 34 J. CORP. L. 843, 844–51 (2009).  Nor are the funds rated by fi-
nancial analysts in the same manner as equity offerings.  See, e.g., John C. Coates IV & R. Glenn Hub-
bard, Competition in the Mutual Fund Industry: Evidence and Implications for Policy, 33 J. CORP. L. 
151, 183 (2007). 
 69. See supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
 70. See Birdthistle, Compensating Power, supra note 22, at 1446; Langevoort, supra note 19, at 
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sors would have to govern funds well lest they drive away an excessive 
amount of sophisticated investment.71 
But empirical studies and, indeed, overt industry marketing and 
products demonstrate that investment advisors intentionally segregate 
institutional and individual investors into separate mutual fund prod-
ucts.72  Investment advisors commonly offer different funds or different 
classes of shares, with far more advantageous pricing, to institutional and 
sophisticated shareholders.73  Exit for less sophisticated investors in this 
context therefore requires action directly on the part of the individual 
shareholder,74 who in turn must rely on disclosure regarding fees and per-
formance by the investment advisor.  Evidence, however, demonstrates 
that neither party in this duet is particularly adroit in playing its role. 
B. No Exit 
With an appreciation for the unique structure of mutual funds and 
their sui generis governance dynamics, we can devote our attention to as-
sessing the effectiveness of the central mutual fund governance mechan-
ism—shareholder exit.  Doing so, however, leads us towards the blurred 
line that separates paradigms of corporate governance and “product 
markets.”75   
Categorizing mutual fund investors as shareholders imbues them 
with all the rights, privileges, and rich theory appertaining thereto.  But 
when we observe that mutual fund shareholders are, in fact, protected 
almost solely by their ability to buy and sell mutual fund shares, they be-
gin to take on the appearance of mere participants in the comparatively 
unprotected arena of product markets.  As we shall see in Jones v. Harris 
Associates L.P., this process of reverse bootstrapping very quickly strips 
away the bulk of legislative protections specifically enacted to protect 
mutual fund shareholders.76  Given such a dynamic, courts might become 
preoccupied with asking why an investor should be treated differently 
from any other widget buyer, rather than asking why an investment advi-
sor should be treated differently from any other corporate fiduciary.  The 
immediate and critical answer is because Congress has determined that 
mutual fund investors belong in the shareholder category.77  Until Con-
 
 71. See Birdthistle, Compensating Power, supra note 22, at 1446; Langevoort, supra note 19, at 
1033. 
 72. See Langevoort, supra note 19, at 1034. 
 73. See Birdthistle, Compensating Power, supra note 22, at 1446. 
 74. For a discussion of the weaknesses of informational intermediaries and conflicts of brokers in 
the mutual fund context, see id. at 1459; see also Jill E. Fisch, Fiduciary Duties and the Analyst Scan-
dals, 58 ALA. L. REV. 1083, 1097–98 (2007) (discussing the conflicts of interests and questionable inde-
pendence of mutual fund analysts). 
 75. See Langevoort, supra note 19, at 1036–40. 
 76. See infra notes 225–34 and accompanying text. 
 77. For a discussion of corporate governance in the mutual fund context, see A. Joseph Warbur-
ton, Should Mutual Funds Be Corporations? A Legal and Econometric Analysis, 33 J. CORP. L. 745, 
746–50 (2008). 
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gress decides otherwise, commentators and courts must operate within 
the corporate governance paradigm, no matter how impoverished the 
mutual fund version may be in comparison to that of typical corpora-
tions. 
Indeed, the mutual fund model of governance is notably weaker 
than that of typical corporations not simply because its array of protec-
tions is far more limited, but also because the efficacy of its lone remain-
ing protection, exit, is seriously handicapped by the demonstrated vul-
nerabilities of both participants in this particular investment dyad. 
Investment advisors have spent much of the past five years recover-
ing from regulatory investigations and private lawsuits into malfeasant 
practices in the operation of mutual funds, such as market timing and 
late trading, for which they have paid billions of dollars in fines, settle-
ment fees, and restitution funds.78  Individual investors, encumbered with 
ever greater responsibility for their own retirement savings as the popu-
larity of 401(k) plans has eclipsed that of pension funds, have demon-
strated little expertise nor the ability to invest prudently.79  Indeed, many 
investors fail even to enroll80 in retirement plans, while large numbers of 
those who do simply leave their contributions uninvested in a default 
cash or money market position.81  Those investors who do consciously al-
locate their contributions either do so too rarely, too riskily, or too rapid-
ly.82  Such behavior occurs even where there are no penalties for imme-
diate withdrawal and when doing so forfeits free matching funds from 
employers, but largely disappears when investors are invested by default.  
One cannot argue that such behavior is contemplated by the rational ac-
tor model without defining away almost the entire concept of irrationali-
ty. 
1. The Failings of Advisors 
For many years, certain observers considered the operation of mu-
tual funds a model of good corporate governance.83  Their relatively un-
blemished performance record was conspicuous in an era of corporate 
accounting fraud perpetrated by executives at Enron and WorldCom.84  
But in September 2003, then New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer 
 
 78. See supra note 23.  See generally Birdthistle, Compensating Power, supra note 22, at 1451–64 
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chicagotribune.com/business/yourmoney/chi-tc-biz-investors-gail-0825-0aug26,0,7183761.column. 
 82. See infra Part I.B.2. 
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 84. See id. at 1–2. 
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announced allegations of wrongdoing in the comparatively staid sector of 
retirement savings.85  Spitzer accused the advisors of specific mutual 
funds of colluding with hedge funds and other sophisticated institutional 
investors in a scheme to siphon profits out of mutual funds at the ex-
pense of individual, long-term investors in those funds.86  Spitzer’s charge 
of “market timing” sparked a long procession of regulatory investiga-
tions by federal and state agencies into the operations of mutual funds.87  
The plaintiffs’ bar quickly followed with a salvo of class-action lawsuits 
against mutual fund advisors, and in the years since Spitzer’s announce-
ment, dozens of advisors have disgorged billions of dollars in fines, set-
tlements, and funds created to remunerate long-term investors.88 
a. Recent Advisor Malfeasance 
The scope of the allegations against investment advisors is remark-
able and impugns a broad array of the ways in which they operated mu-
tual funds in recent years.89  The past demidecade of public and private 
investigations unearthed a host of remarkable improprieties by invest-
ment advisors, the first and most prominent of which was a practice 
known as market timing.90 
Market timing, per se, is neither illegal nor very unusual in the in-
vestment world.  In fact, the principle—which simply involves investors 
purchasing and redeeming investments rapidly and forcefully upon the 
strength of temporal market developments91—is close to the core beha-
vior of what one might expect of institutional and sophisticated investors.  
If news breaks regarding the discovery of a fresh petroleum reserve in 
the South China Sea, then rapid purchases of a mutual fund specializing 
in energy producers or Southeast Asian economies make perfect sense.  
Similarly, reports of an earthquake in Japan would naturally trigger 
prompt liquidations in a mutual fund holding concentrations of stocks 
listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange.  These practices are neither surpris-
ing nor illicit.92 
The rapid acquisition and redemption of large blocks of shares in a 
mutual fund can, however, dilute the returns to long-term investors who 
hold their positions throughout such volatility, to the benefit of the mar-
ket timers.  Investment advisors to mutual funds have long been aware of 
 
 85. See Press Release, Office of the N.Y. Att’y Gen. Eliot Spitzer, State Investigation Reveals 
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 92. See id. at 174. 
 
76 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2010 
this wealth transfer, and to assuage long-term investors, many advisors 
voluntarily enacted policies that prohibit such trading activity in the 
funds they advise.93 
What is illegal is for an advisor to publish a mutual fund prospectus 
that declares that a fund’s policy is to disallow market timing and then to 
abet market timing.94  Evidently, several investment advisors—in contra-
vention of their statements expressly prohibiting market timing in their 
own prospectuses—countenanced such trading by institutional inves-
tors.95  Why would they do such a thing?  Because as a quid pro quo for 
market timing one mutual fund,96 the institutional investors would typi-
cally park “sticky assets” in a related but separate mutual fund.  In such 
an arrangement, the investment advisor—who is compensated by receiv-
ing a percentage of all assets under management—will receive concrete 
dollars from the sticky assets that more than compensate for any admin-
istrative or other qualms about the market timing.  The long-term inves-
tors in the timed fund, however, are not similarly compensated.97 
A separate practice, known as late trading, is per se illegal.98  Be-
cause the determination of the value of a share in a mutual fund requires 
a complex calculation of the total value of the fund’s portfolio (including 
large blocks of shares of possibly hundreds of separate issuers, plus cash, 
minus amounts owed to the fund’s vendors, such as brokerage houses 
and law firms) and then the division of that figure by the total number of 
outstanding shares in the fund, mutual funds have historically waited un-
til the close of business (and the resulting cessation of movement in the 
prices of portfolio securities) to compute the price per share.99  Although 
these calculations can be computed instantaneously today, regulations 
still require the industry to use this method of “forward pricing” mutual 
fund shares once a day, after the close of business.100  So when an investor 
places a buy order for a mutual fund, he or she must wait until after 4:00 
p.m. eastern time for the trade to be executed and to learn the price of 
the share.101  Similarly, upon redemption, sell orders must be placed be-
fore 4:00 p.m. in order to receive that day’s price.102 
Because mutual fund advisors need some time to administer buy 
and sell orders for trades after the close of business, this rather ungainly 
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pricing system can be gamed by anyone who learns of market-moving in-
formation shortly after the close of business.  Consider, for instance, a 
situation in which the market closes at 4:00 p.m.  The advisor computes 
the price of a fund’s shares at 4:05 p.m., and a major corporate issuer 
whose stock is held by the mutual fund announces excellent financial 
news at 4:10 p.m.  If one could slip a buy order into the trading system at 
4:15 p.m. (well after the trading deadline) and still receive the day’s now-
stale price, one would guarantee a gain in the fund, which could be rea-
lized by selling shares the very next day.  As an industry adage has it, the 
investor would in essence be betting on a race that has already been run.  
Various entities associated with the mutual fund industry—typically bro-
kerage houses responsible for accumulating clients’ buy and sell orders—
have settled accusations of facilitating this late trading.103 
A third charge involves a practice known as “fair valuation” and its 
unfair use.104  Because the investment advisor to a mutual fund receives 
its compensation purely as a function of the fund’s total assets under 
management, the advisor has a powerful incentive to increase the assets 
under management in every way possible.  One way is to choose wise and 
prudent investments that increase in value, thereby expanding the hold-
ings of every investor in the fund.  Another, less challenging, method is 
simply to attract more new investors to the fund.  And a third, even less 
taxing, approach is simply to overstate the true or “fair” value of the 
fund’s assets. 
Of course, an advisor may have a difficult time suggesting that the 
ten shares of Google that it owns are worth $1000 when anyone with 
access to a newspaper can calculate that they are worth only $750.  What 
is easier to manipulate, however, is the accurate value of a mutual fund’s 
investment that is not regularly or publicly priced.  If a fund owns real 
estate or stock in a private corporation for whose shares there is no pub-
lic market, for example, then a fund’s advisor may more easily distort the 
fund’s overall value and, accordingly, inflate the advisor’s fee.  In decep-
tions of this sort, what typically occurs is that the advisor purchases 
shares in a privately held corporation for the fund; then an event that de-
leteriously impacts the value of that company’s shares takes place, such 
as crippling litigation or product failures.  Any reasonable appraiser 
would note that the value of the fund’s holding had dropped, even with-
out the benefit of regular market prices.  But, should an advisor wish un-
lawfully to take advantage of these stale prices, it could retain on its 
books the stock’s value as the price it originally paid for the invest-
ment.105 
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How could a conscientious advisor determine a price in the absence 
of a market transaction?  Scrupulous trustees and investors require advi-
sors to retain the services of independent, third-party appraisers who 
specialize in determining fair values for fund holdings for which there are 
no readily available market prices.106  Advisors who choose not to value 
their funds’ holdings fairly and regularly can easily extract excessive fees 
from the funds and their investors.107 
Over the past five years, a horde of public regulators and private li-
tigators has extracted billions of dollars in settlements and fees from ad-
visors arising out of these and yet more108 allegations of malfeasance.  
Among many, for example, Bank of America paid $675 million in set-
tlement fees; Bear Stearns paid $250 million; Massachusetts Financial 
Services paid $225 million; Janus Capital Group paid $225 million; Al-
liance Capital Management paid $600 million; and Pilgrim Baxter paid 
$100 million.109  Mutual fund advisors have compiled a recent track 
record that complicates assumptions that market forces alone produce 
results that benefit investors who entrust their savings to advisors.110 
b. Ongoing Practices 
Some observers of the mutual fund industry believe that additional 
troubling practices exist but have yet to attract public attention.111  One 
such example involves the widespread use of so-called “12b-1 fees.”112  
These fees—eponymously named for the securities regulation that per-
mits their use113—are paid out of the assets of mutual funds (thereby de-
creasing the returns to existing investors in those funds) to advisors or 
their affiliates or counterparties for the purpose of marketing the fund to 
new potential investors.  Customarily, one might expect the advisors, as 
direct beneficiaries of marketing efforts that increase the amount of as-
sets under management, to bear such marketing expenses. 
Why should mutual fund investors agree to spend money advertis-
ing their investments to the general public?  Because, in theory, if a mu-
tual fund grows increasingly popular, greater amounts of assets will flow 
into the fund from new investors.  With greater assets under manage-
ment, the investment advisor should be able to realize economies of scale 
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in the management of the fund and then to pass those savings through to 
shareholders in the form of price breaks in the fund’s advisory fee.  
Those price breaks should, in turn, redound to the benefit of each exist-
ing investor in the form of lower expense ratios.  Observers are skeptical, 
however, that advisors who do charge 12b-1 fees and thereby successfully 
increase the size of their funds do in fact pass on a commensurate 
amount of fee discounts.114  In such circumstances, some advisors have 
used existing investors’ money to attract new investors who, in turn, pay 
more management fees to the advisor without any corresponding materi-
al benefit to investors.115  Although the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (SEC) has intimated future action on this topic, the impact of 
these practices has yet to be reported widely by the investment media.116 
2. The Frailty of Investors 
The recent performance of certain investment advisors in the re-
tirement savings field is accompanied by the less-intentional foibles of 
their clients.  Not only does shareholder exit require vigilance by individ-
ual mutual fund investors, but increasing proportions of investment as-
sets are flowing into individual investment accounts.117  The pressure on 
individual investors to manage their savings wisely has dramatically in-
creased in recent years as a greater percentage of personal savings has 
migrated from pension funds to defined contribution accounts. 
Unfortunately, individual investors have not performed well under 
this new burden, demonstrating poor records at two critical stages of the 
investment process: first, at the moment of enrolling in retirement plans; 
and, second, when making investment decisions with their savings.118 
a. The Growth of Individual Investing 
In recent decades, the mechanism by which American employees 
save for their retirement has undergone a somewhat bureaucratic but 
nevertheless profound alteration.  Retirement savings have moved stead-
ily from institutionally managed pension funds to individually directed 
retirement accounts.119  The responsibility for the safe and effective ste-
wardship of retirement savings has, accordingly, shifted increasingly from 
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employers to employees.120  At the same time, the sophistication of the 
investment management of those monies has steadily declined, thus 
greatly intensifying the danger of ineffective conservation of personal 
finances for retirement.121 
Although some prominent sectors of the American workforce, such 
as state and federal government122 and the automobile industry,123 still 
provide for the retirement of employees through the use of collective 
pension funds, the pension has grown increasingly less popular as a 
mechanism for saving in the United States.124  In 2007, private pension 
funds held $2.4 trillion, state and local government pension funds held 
$3.2 trillion, and federal pension funds held $1.7 trillion; although those 
figures are substantial, they constituted less than forty percent of the 
$17.6 trillion in total U.S. retirement assets.125  Just two decades ago, 
pensions comprised well more than fifty percent of those assets.126 
So today, increasing numbers of individual employees, rather than 
the professional managers of pension plans of yore, bear the responsibili-
ty for determining how much money to set aside each month, to which 
financial institutions these contributions should be entrusted, and to 
which securities the savings should be allocated to provide for a future 
retirement.127  As Sunstein and Thaler have observed, 
The standard economic theory of saving for retirement is both 
elegant and simple.  People are assumed to calculate how much 
they are going to earn over the rest of their lifetime, figure out how 
much they will need when they retire, and then save up just enough 
to enjoy a comfortable retirement without sacrificing too much 
while they are still working. 
As a guideline for how to think sensibly about saving, this 
theory is excellent, but as an approach to how people actually be-
have, the theory runs into . . . serious problems.128 
b. Failure to Enroll 
Notwithstanding theoretical postulates to the contrary, empirical 
evidence suggests that, by and large, the average employee is not particu-
larly adept at making long-range financial forecasts, immediate economic 
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sacrifices, or the type of ongoing investment decisions necessary to en-
sure a healthy corpus on which to retire decades hence.129  Indeed, data 
reveal that substantial numbers of employees fail even to enroll in de-
fined-contribution plans in which their employers promise to contribute 
substantial amounts or when there is no penalty for early or immediate 
withdrawal from such accounts.130  In effect, these employees are discard-
ing winning lottery tickets or “not bothering to cash [their] paycheck.”131 
Each future retiree has two basic choices when deciding how to save 
for supernumeracy.  Either one can simply invest whatever money is left 
unspent from one’s paychecks, or one can enroll in a savings plan that, 
with the forbearance of the federal taxing authorities, allows funds to be 
directed towards investment without first being subject to personal 
income taxation.132  Obviously, the latter approach, which uses pre-tax 
dollars, is the vastly superior method.  Indeed, the very reason Congress 
permits the use of tax-advantaged accounts—such as Individual 
Retirement Accounts (IRAs), 401(k) and 403(b) plans, and so forth—is 
to encourage personal saving.133  Many private employers further 
enhance the attractiveness of such tax-advantaged accounts by 
voluntarily agreeing to contribute certain sums into each employee’s 
defined-contribution account.134  All that the employee needs to do to 
enjoy these substantial financial benefits is enroll.  And yet many 
nevertheless fall at this first molehill.135 
Certainly, there may be rational reasons for choosing not to partici-
pate in a tax-advantaged savings scheme.  If, for instance, one desperate-
ly needs every penny one earns to meet current financial burdens, the 
project of saving for the future—in any format—is simply an unafford-
able luxury.  But many who fail to enroll in these accounts do not do so 
for this kind of reason.  Approximately thirty percent of all U.S. em-
ployees who are eligible to participate in a 401(k) plan do not enroll.136  
Studies conducted in other countries where there are no penalties for 
withdrawing sums from these accounts before retirement reveal that as 
many as half of all employees entitled to receive matching sums from 
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employers still do not enroll.137  In systems with no penalty for early 
withdrawal, there is no rational justification for failing to enroll, as one 
can simply withdraw the funds right away to pay for any current needs.138  
Any effective governance of this field must therefore accept that inves-
tors frequently behave in ways that are not rational and must take their 
actual behavior into account. 
c. Investment Indiscipline 
For those employees who do successfully enroll in their defined-
contribution plan, abjure the instant gratification of some portion of their 
present salary, and allocate their savings into a specific investment op-
tion, one selection above all others dominates their choice.  As we have 
seen, the primary vehicle through which U.S. citizens invest their savings 
is the mutual fund: forty-four percent of all U.S. households now own 
these funds.139  The decisive majority of U.S. savings—over ten trillion 
dollars of the total seventeen trillion dollars—eventually make their way, 
either directly or indirectly, into mutual funds.140  In the five years from 
2003 through 2007, U.S. households demonstrated their investing prefe-
rence by selling almost three trillion dollars of directly held stock while 
investing over two trillion dollars in mutual funds.141 
But even once investors successfully make it across the threshold 
and into tax-advantaged savings accounts, opportunities for making poor 
investment decisions in mutual funds abound.  Many investors contribute 
too little to their plans over time, while others attempt to time market 
movements and trade too rapidly, which erodes principal through buying 
high and selling low and through transaction fees.142  But the most critical 
investment errors can be divided into two broad categories: poor asset 
allocations and poor fund selections. 
In recent months, news reports have recounted stories of investors 
who, just a few years or months away from retirement, have seen large 
chunks of their nest eggs evaporate in the market collapse.143  While these 
accounts are distressing, they reveal a common investing mistake: the 
misallocation of portfolio assets.  Modern portfolio theory suggests that, 
as investors approach retirement, the composition of their retirement 
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portfolios should grow ever more conservative.144  In practice, this dictate 
would mean that the percentage of retirement assets allocated to stocks, 
which are comparatively risk-laden investments, should diminish relative 
to the percentage of assets allocated to cash, treasury bills, or other 
comparatively risk-free investments.145  Any investors on the eve of 
retirement who lose fifty percent of their retirement portfolios in a stock 
market crash appear to have grossly misallocated their investments. 
Even assuming that some investors may have prudently allocated 
their assets to create an age-appropriate blend of different classes of risk, 
they must still choose how to effectuate those allocations.  That is, if an 
investor determines that the optimal allocation of her assets should be 
fifty percent in stocks and fifty percent in bonds, how should she then go 
about actually investing her money in stocks and bonds?  A prudent in-
vestment approach would counsel in favor of a broad diversification 
within each asset class, which would suggest that our investor should pur-
chase a mutual fund, an exchange-traded fund, or another diversified ve-
hicle to hold the assets allocated to securities.146  But the choice of a par-
ticular fund, and whether it is actively or passively managed, can make a 
critical difference. 
Passively managed funds typically attempt to track a particular in-
dex, such as the Standard & Poor’s 500 or the Dow Jones Industrial Av-
erage, and the task requires no imagination or judgment—the fund simp-
ly mimics the index.147  Actively managed funds, on the other hand, 
attempt to beat the market through the use of formulae or strategies de-
vised and deployed by human portfolio managers.  Time and time again, 
studies demonstrate that passive funds consistently outperform active 
funds in the long run.148  
Notwithstanding these robust findings, many investors nevertheless 
choose to invest in actively managed funds because of the renown of par-
ticular portfolio managers who have won outsized returns in recent 
years.  Not only do managers eventually prove themselves to be very 
human, but actively managed funds carry much higher fees on average 
than passively managed funds.149 
As Donald Langevoort and Paul Mahoney have shown, we now 
have “enough data on mutual fund investor behavior to gain some useful 
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insight”;150 unhappily, the insight those data reveal consists largely of 
“discomfiting results.”151  An extensive catalog of studies examining the 
behavior of mutual fund investors reveals, for instance, that there is “a 
negative relationship between returns and both fees and trading ex-
penses,” that “market-beating strategies are hard to find or sustain,” and 
that “those who pay for above-average performance are likely to be dis-
appointed should they ever come to understand their results.”152 
Whether an investor is particularly lethargic or vigorous, both ex-
tremes hold dangers for retirement accounts that are uninvested or over-
invested.  Thus, saving for retirement effectively requires a discipline and 
vigor beyond the behavioral capacity of many investors. 
3. The Weakness of Shareholder Exit 
Even assuming an ideal investment market in which advisors reli-
ably disclosed all material information and investors were capable of act-
ing rationally upon that information, the effectiveness of exit is still con-
strained by two external factors that are widespread across the mutual 
fund industry: taxes and market timing rules.153 
Investors whose mutual fund holdings would be subject to particu-
larly harsh tax consequences upon sale might reasonably choose not to 
exit a fund whose advisor has raised fees beyond an otherwise acceptable 
level.154  Similarly, investors may be discouraged from selling by the cost 
of levies that many fund complexes impose to discourage market timing 
by investors who trade in and out of any given fund within a short period 
of time.155  In both circumstances, an investor who is dissatisfied with an 
advisory fee may nevertheless decline to exit. 
Finally but critically, consider the particularly acute impact of advi-
sory fees upon investors who are constrained from freely exiting a mu-
tual fund.  Advisory fees are, in many ways, a species of executive com-
pensation paid to external management,156 but the mutual fund context is 
distinctive in that increases in advisory fees have a larger relative impact 
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upon investment performance.  Whereas executive compensation typical-
ly has an indirect and relatively minor effect, if any, upon the price of a 
corporation’s stock, the impact of advisory fees on a mutual fund inves-
tor’s return is direct and immediate.157  Imagine, for example, that the se-
nior executive officer of Disney negotiates an enormous compensation 
package.158  Even an admittedly vast sum is still almost sure to be insigni-
ficant in comparison to the overall revenues of the corporation and thus 
to the growth or income associated with the company’s stock.159  In con-
trast, every additional percentage point that an investment advisor 
charges for its services comes directly out of the returns of investors.  
Over time, the compounded effect of even minutely larger fees can 
gravely diminish an investor’s net returns in mutual funds.160 
These mundane yet plentiful illustrations demonstrate the perils of 
relying solely on a single governance measure to produce effective go-
vernance in mutual funds.  At the same time that the efficacy of exit as 
an effective market force is dampened in several ways, the impact of 
comparatively small increases on advisory fees has a profoundly detri-
mental impact upon the returns of shareholders in mutual funds.   
Most importantly, empirical studies demonstrate the very real limi-
tations that these constraints impose upon the actual competitiveness of 
mutual funds: the industry features remarkably high price dispersion—as 
great as 300 percent in one large sector—and “thus does not appear to 
conform to the ‘law of one price’”161 while at the same time, “expense ra-
tios, portfolio turnover, and load fees are significantly and negatively re-
lated to performance.”162  These studies, in effect, conclude that however 
promising shareholder exit may be in theory, in practice it does not func-
tion effectively—when a market abounds with funds that perform worse 
and yet charge more, that market is neither competitive nor healthy. 
II. JUDICIAL PRECEDENT & THE SECTION 36(B) FIDUCIARY DUTY 
Against this background of theoretical and empirical limits on inde-
pendent behavior by investment advisors and shareholders in the gover-
nance of mutual funds, Jones v. Harris Associates L.P. presents the con-
sequent issue of whether the two types of parties nevertheless function 
effectively when working together.163 
The single most important nexus of the relationship between an in-
vestor and an investment advisor is the price that the investor pays for 
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the advisor’s services.  In Jones, the Supreme Court must decide whether 
the judiciary may, or indeed must, defer to market forces when determin-
ing whether that price is consistent with the advisor’s fiduciary duty set 
forth in section 36(b) of the Investment Company Act.164  To reach that 
question, the Court must first ascertain the doctrinal role of market 
forces in this body of jurisprudence and then evaluate their efficacy in 
governing mutual funds. 
What makes this case of greater consequence than simply a clarifi-
cation of the fiduciary duty of an investment advisor is the contributions 
of Easterbrook and Posner, two of the country’s foremost jurists and 
economic intellectuals.165  Their sharp disagreement as to the nature of 
the market for investment advisory services encapsulates a timely and vi-
tal debate on the state of the two leading modes of the economic analysis 
of law: neoclassical law and economics versus behavioral law and eco-
nomics.166 
When considering the judicial resolution of these issues, a cynical 
observer might attempt to predict the case’s outcome using crude heuris-
tics such as whether one of those lower court positions is more “conser-
vative” or less “judicially activist” and therefore more appealing to the 
majority of current Supreme Court Justices.  Without endorsing or de-
bating the definition of those terms this litigation nevertheless resists 
simplistic categorization because of the ideological and political similari-
ties of the two dueling appellate jurists.  One would be hard pressed to 
substantiate a meaningful difference between their judicial philosophies, 
either politically or economically.167  And although Posner’s dissent is 
clearly more favorable to the plaintiffs,168 Easterbrook’s opinion rests 
upon a notable lack of deference towards congressional decisionmak-
ing.169  To complicate the wagering further, the Supreme Court in its most 
recent Term twice sided with plaintiffs against corporate defendants, in 
Wyeth v. Levine170 and Altria Group, Inc. v. Good,171 despite warnings of 
increased litigation and arguments that congressional intent pointed in 
the opposite direction.172  The relevant congressional action in Jones v. 
Harris Associates L.P., meanwhile, supports the plaintiffs.173  With these 
superficialities acknowledged and handicapped, we must now parse the 
actual statutory and judicial complexities of this dispute. 
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A. The Background of Excessive Fees Litigation 
Previously, we noted the language and legislative history of the sec-
tion 36(b) fiduciary duty, which Congress enacted in the Investment 
Company Amendments Act of 1970.174  Congress has never provided a 
definition of that duty, instead appearing content to abdicate the devel-
opment of the scope and effect of the duty to the judiciary, and the fed-
eral courts have since attempted to fill that void.175 
A dozen years after the passage of section 36(b), the Second Circuit 
handed down a seminal, albeit imprecise, elucidation of the fiduciary du-
ty in Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Management, Inc.176  Notwith-
standing a certain degree of opaque reasoning set forth in Gartenberg, 
this case held almost universal sway over the industry’s conception of the 
duty for more than a quarter century, until last year’s Seventh Circuit 
ruling in Jones.177 
Even though the SEC and the mutual fund industry have fully en-
coded and incorporated the guidance of Gartenberg into their contract 
renewal regulations and associated operations,178 the case itself fails to 
explicate the fiduciary duty clearly.  As Lyman Johnson points out, the 
ruling contains “two quite different” phrasings of the test that appear 
contradictory and confused.179  In one, the court “adopt[ed] a two-prong 
approach,”180 holding that to violate the section 36(b) duty, an investment 
advisor “must charge a fee that is so disproportionately large that it bears 
no reasonable relationship to the services rendered and could not have 
been the product of arm’s-length bargaining.”181  In the other, the court 
stated that “the test is essentially whether the fee schedule represents a 
charge within the range of what would have been negotiated at arm’s-
length in the light of all the surrounding circumstances.”182  As Johnson 
notes, the first test appears to be substantive, while the second is more 
procedural (though reliant on an arm’s-length process that the Second 
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Circuit and the legislative history acknowledge is almost never present in 
the mutual fund industry).183  The effect of these formulations is to obfus-
cate whether the appropriate standard equates to corporate law’s estab-
lished touchstones of waste, reasonableness, or fairness. 
To complicate the Gartenberg ruling further, the Second Circuit 
then identified a set of several elements that it deemed “important” in 
the determination of whether an advisor has violated its fiduciary duty.  
These Gartenberg factors include (1) “rates charged by other adviser-
managers to other similar funds,” (2) “the adviser-manager’s cost in pro-
viding the service,” (3) “the nature and quality of the service,” (4) “the 
extent to which the adviser-manager realizes economies of scale as the 
fund grows larger,” and (5) “the volume of orders which must be 
processed by the manager.”184  Boards of trustees and courts have subse-
quently cataloged these factors in their deliberations, without precisely 
clarifying their relative weight, their interaction with one another, or ex-
actly how an investment advisor might run afoul of them.185  At the same 
time, boards and courts have practically ignored potentially the most 
probative factor, mentioned in footnote three of Gartenberg: the compar-
ison of different rates charged to institutional and individual clients.186 
In fact, from the time of the enactment of section 36(b) in 1970 until 
the grant of certiorari in Jones in 2009, no mutual fund shareholder ever 
managed to convince a court that an investment advisor had breached its 
fiduciary duty.187  As Johnson has observed, this record means either that 
the investment advisory business is a model of perfection or that “some-
thing is amiss under section 36(b).”188  From the foregoing analysis of the 
governance of the investment advisory business, evidence suggests that 
perfection is the unlikelier of these two alternatives.189 
B. Easterbrook and Neoclassical Law and Economics 
After this four-decade succession of unbroken judicial victories by 
investment advisors, the remarkable decision by Easterbrook arrived in 
Jones v. Harris Associates L.P.190  Easterbrook openly and enthusiastical-
ly broke with the Gartenberg precedent, not to reverse the ill fortunes of 
plaintiff shareholders but to compound them.  In his Seventh Circuit 
panel opinion, Easterbrook offered an alternative formulation of the sec-
tion 36(b) standard that effectively removes the fiduciary duty from the 
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regulatory edifice.191  His new ruling thus replaced a Gartenberg doctrinal 
regime that was theoretically, if not practically, open to shareholders 
with one that is far more hostile, reducing success under section 36(b) to 
a virtual impossibility.192 
In an opinion with a more legislative than judicial tenor, Easter-
brook took notice of the state of competition in the industry and then in-
terpreted the statute anew through the lens of neoclassical law and eco-
nomics.  He presumed a well-functioning market for investment advice, 
discounted possibly irrational investor behavior, and concluded with a 
call for greater deregulation of the industry.  “[W]e are skeptical about 
Gartenberg because it relies too little on markets,” he announced.193 
First, Easterbrook confronted the statute’s textual imposition of a 
fiduciary duty but found and applied a minimalist interpretation of that 
legal concept that is difficult to distinguish from the existing background 
regime of securities regulations.194  Second, he updated and overruled 
congressional findings that the market for mutual funds was dysfunction-
al by substituting his own judicial observation of the market’s ostensible 
health today.195 
But Easterbrook’s evaluation of the mutual fund market—upon 
which rests his entire argument—confuses concepts of governance and 
product markets.  Critically, his approach fails to appreciate that the 
structure of mutual funds is materially distinct from that of ordinary cor-
porations and that the behavior of mutual fund shareholders falls far 
short of the theoretical ideals of rationality.196 
The facts of Jones are similar to those of most lawsuits in which an 
investor alleges that an investment advisor has charged excessive fees for 
the advisor’s services.197  Put succinctly, three investors—Jerry Jones, 
Mary Jones, and Arline Winerman—who held shares in mutual funds 
managed by the investment advisor, Harris Associates L.P., filed suit 
against the advisor alleging a breach of the advisor’s fiduciary duty im-
posed by section 36(b) because of the advisor’s inordinately high fees.198 
In constructing his economic reinterpretation of section 36(b), Eas-
terbrook first faced the challenge posed by the fiduciary duty.  Without 
more, the term “fiduciary duty” could describe a broad range of obliga-
tions, from the most minimal requirements of a bailee to the far more 
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onerous responsibilities of an executor.199  Justice Frankfurter succinctly 
captured the concept’s indeterminacy: 
But to say that a man is a fiduciary only begins analysis; it gives di-
rection to further inquiry.  To whom is he a fiduciary?  What obliga-
tions does he owe as a fiduciary?  In what respect has he failed to 
discharge these obligations?  And what are the consequences of his 
deviation from duty?200 
A creative jurist unconstrained by precedent can, therefore, select any 
point along this spectrum to reach a preferred outcome.  In this case, 
Easterbrook looked neither to mutual fund precedent nor to Delaware 
corporate law for guidance, but instead to the law of trusts.201  There he 
found guidance for his new statement of the section 36(b) duty: “A fidu-
ciary must make full disclosure and play no tricks but is not subject to a 
cap on compensation.”202 
If Easterbrook’s interpretation of the duty is correct, then section 
36(b) adds nothing to the background array of antifraud provisions that 
have long existed in this regulatory regime.  Investment advisors were al-
ready obligated to “make full disclosure and play no tricks” by section 
34(b) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 (proscribing untrue state-
ments of material fact in a registration statement or other documents);203 
section 206 of the Investment Advisors Act of 1940 (proscribing any 
fraud upon clients or prospective clients);204 sections 11, 12, and 17 of the 
Securities Act of 1933 (providing civil liability for false registration 
statements and for noncompliant prospectuses and proscribing fraudu-
lent interstate transactions);205 and section 10(b) of the Exchange Act206 
and Exchange Act Rule 10b-5207 (proscribing the use of any manipulative 
or deceptive devices).  Easterbrook would appear to be arguing that sec-
tion 36(b) is pure surplusage to these existing proscriptions and that the 
duty’s language “with respect to the receipt of compensation for servic-
es” is an otiose appendage with no relevant meaning.208 
In that same sentence in which he reworked the Gartenberg duty, 
Easterbrook also eliminated Gartenberg’s substantive cap on compensa-
tion.209  Later he temporized by acknowledging that a fee twenty-five 
times above the next highest might suggest deceit or negligence: 
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It is possible to imagine compensation so unusual that a court will 
infer that deceit must have occurred, or that the persons responsible 
for decision have abdicated—for example, if a university’s board of 
trustees decides to pay the president $50 million a year, when no 
other president of a comparable institution receives more than $2 
million . . . .210 
Applied to mutual funds, this standard would mean that investment advi-
sors could charge a fee greater than fifty percent of assets without trig-
gering judicial suspicion.  Although this scenario may be “possible to im-
agine,”211 it is not a serious substantive limit of any kind. 
Easterbrook was unimpressed with arguments that relied on the 
motivations of Congress in enacting Section 36(b).  Although legislative 
history, such as the Senate report accompanying the passage of the 1970 
amendments to the 1940 Act, takes extensive note of the weaknesses of 
the structure and practice of the mutual fund industry in producing effec-
tive competition, Easterbrook dismissed such arguments because “Con-
gress did not enact its members’ beliefs; it enacted a text.”212  Besides, he 
added, “[a] lot has happened in the last 38 years”213 and positions cannot 
be taken today merely on the strength of “suppositions about the market 
conditions of 1970.”214   
If no meaningful fiduciary duty or substantive cap exist and con-
gressional intent is irrelevant, what then will prevent advisors from over-
charging shareholders?  Competition, answered Easterbrook.215  Other 
courts, commentators, and even Congress may have “expressed some 
skepticism of competition’s power to constrain investment advisers’ 
fees,”216 but all of them are wrong.   
The issue of market competition in mutual funds was not raised be-
fore the trial court or briefed by any party.217  Easterbrook provided a de-
fense of the market with his own assessment.  “Today,” he noted, “thou-
sands of mutual funds compete.  The pages of the Wall Street Journal 
teem with listings.”218  (Surely the number of advisors would be the more 
relevant datum.)  Easterbrook proceeds by arguing that “[h]olding costs 
down is vital in competition,” and “[a]n adviser can’t make money from 
its captive fund if high fees drive investors away.”219  This argument as-
sumes that high fees do, in fact, drive investors away, a claim contra-
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dicted by multiple studies.220  Further, Easterbrook attempted to preempt 
a counterargument that most investors in mutual funds are simple inno-
cents: “It won’t do to reply that most investors are unsophisticated and 
don’t compare prices.  The sophisticated investors who do shop create a 
competitive pressure that protects the rest.”221  This argument assumes 
that sophisticated and unsophisticated investors are, in fact, shopping 
within the same pool, which is not the case with mutual funds. 
Within this set of arguments, Easterbrook committed two particu-
larly large errors that negatively reinforced each other.  First, he failed to 
take account of the substantial idiosyncrasies in the structure and gover-
nance of mutual funds, insisting instead that “[t]hings work the same way 
for business corporations.”222  Second, he confused a governance system 
affecting shareholders with a products market involving buyers by, for 
instance, demanding to know why judges who “would not dream of regu-
lating the price of automobiles,”223 should wish to do so for mutual funds. 
In this somewhat “living Constitution”224 approach to interpreting 
the market, Easterbrook insisted that the market today is far different 
and more competitive than it was thirty-eight years ago, which is why we 
may disregard such an outdated congressional view.225  Certainly his 
claims with respect to the numbers of funds, advisors, and dollars may be 
true, but congressional objections to the state of this market centered not 
on those numbers but on the structure of the industry.226  As we have al-
ready seen, the broad spectrum of sentinels protecting corporations from 
poor governance are, in the context of mutual funds, dramatically re-
duced to the solitary and, in this context, enfeebled exit option.227  Rather 
than shoring up this vulnerability, Easterbrook exploited it by engaging 
in reverse bootstrapping that erroneously treated investors as buyers, 
thereby overriding their congressionally imposed protections.  If judges 
do not dream of regulating the price of automobiles it is because the 
buyers of automobiles, unlike the shareholders of mutual funds, are nei-
ther shareholders nor beneficiaries of a fiduciary duty.  Congress has 
chosen to create such a distinction fully aware of its implications—it has 
considered and rejected the alternative approach of categorizing mutual 
fund investments as mere products.228  Where investors entrust their as-
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sets for retirement is, after all, ultimately of far greater import and risk 
than the purchase of a car or any other widget.  Of course, the ultimate 
irony in any celebration of today’s mutual fund market over its predeces-
sors is that it requires one to ignore the very recent and large scale fail-
ures of advisors and investors in this market.229 
In sum, Easterbrook’s opinion is a tour-de-force of orthodox law 
and economics.  He spends little time considering either the intent or 
content of Congress’s enactment of the fiduciary duty in dispute, which 
was imposed upon investment advisors expressly “with respect to the re-
ceipt of compensation for services.”230  He concludes that the duty re-
quires nothing more than that advisors refrain from defrauding their in-
vestors, notwithstanding that such prohibition was already imposed by 
the existing securities regulations.  He justifies the diminution of this leg-
islative protection—in contravention of the Gartenberg line of 
precedent—by pointing instead to the salutary and inoculating powers of 
market competition.231  Without examining the unique structure of mu-
tual funds, he concludes that such competition does exist in this industry 
because there are a profusion of investment products available and be-
cause one academic study—by John Coates and Glenn Hubbard232—
reached the same conclusion.  He does not discuss multiple academic 
studies that demonstrate the troubling breadth of price dispersion 
amongst mutual fund fees or that show a highly problematic negative re-
lationship between fund fees and performance.233  He disregards the sug-
gestion that investors may behave irrationally by investing in funds with 
high fees or by failing to shop for low fees by invoking the standard eco-
nomic point that sophisticated investors can act as sentinels for unsophis-
ticated investors in the same pool.234  Finally, he concludes that a less re-
gulated model of this industry is the better approach.235  Much of this 
opinion could be drawn from the early law-and-economic texts of a few 
decades ago.236 
C. Posner and Behavioral Law and Economics 
In dissenting from the Seventh Circuit’s decision to deny rehearing 
en banc, Posner vigorously rebutted Easterbrook’s arguments, not by re-
jecting economic analysis, but by calling for a more nuanced, subtle, and 
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sophisticated version of such an analysis.237  Posner’s dissent incorporates 
a more behavioralist approach that displays vigilance for market failures, 
calls attention to recurring and predictable distortions of the incentives 
of market participants, and countenances a role for regulatory or private 
interventions in poorly functioning economic systems.238  And, for Pos-
ner, the investment industry is such a disordered market.239 
Posner began his dissent by declaring that the panel’s economic 
analysis “is ripe for reexamination on the basis of growing indications 
that executive compensation in large publicly traded firms often is exces-
sive because of the feeble incentives of boards of directors to police 
compensation.”240  Easterbrook’s faith in the disciplining effect of mul-
tiple markets is misplaced, he argues, because “[c]ompetition in product 
and capital markets can’t be counted on to solve the problem because the 
same structure of incentives operates on all large corporations and simi-
lar entities, including mutual funds.”241  Posner is unwilling to give these 
entities the benefit of the assumption of a well-functioning market be-
cause “[m]utual funds are a component of the financial services industry, 
where abuses have been rampant, as is more evident now than it was 
when Coates and Hubbard wrote their article.”242  
Indeed, he cited a contrary academic study in which the researcher 
found  
evidence that connections among agents in [the mutual fund 
industry] foster favoritism, to the detriment of investors.  Fund 
directors and advisory firms that manage the funds hire each other 
preferentially based on past interactions.  When directors and the 
management are more connected, advisors capture more rents and 
are monitored by the board less intensely.243 
He also invoked a study by the SEC’s Office of Economic Analysis, 
which similarly reached a conclusion opposite to that of the Coates-
Hubbard paper.244 
A judge who relies on a solitary source might be suspected of cher-
ry-picking evidence, particularly in a field such as this, which features 
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such a wealth of contradictory findings by legal and financial experts,245 
including a Nobel laureate.246  The Coates-Hubbard paper is notable be-
cause its conclusion that the industry is competitive contradicts a great 
number of other studies of this subject.247  Easterbrook ignored directly 
contradictory findings of numerous other academics and regulators.248  
On the strength of a shallow review of the relevant literature and a non-
existent record on this issue, Easterbrook leapt to confirm an inclination 
that this market operated efficiently. 
For Posner, as for the plaintiffs, the most troubling indicium of a 
lack of competitiveness in the industry generally, and in this case specifi-
cally, is the wide pricing disparity between the fees that advisors charge 
to retail investors in their mutual funds and the fees they charge to unaf-
filiated institutional investors.249  And Posner was particularly distressed 
by Easterbrook’s failure to consider this discrepancy seriously.250  The 
panel’s opinion focused primarily on comparing the fees that one advisor 
charges its funds to the fees charged by other, similarly situated advisors 
to their own funds.  But, as Posner points out, such a comparison is valu-
able only if one has reason to believe that the market is competitive.251  If 
that market is not competitive, then the fact that many advisors are 
charging similar fees may prove nothing more than the fact that investors 
in all the funds are being overcharged: “The governance structure that 
enables mutual fund advisers to charge exorbitant fees is industry-wide, 
so the panel’s comparability approach would if widely followed allow 
those fees to become the industry’s floor.”252 
Posner concluded his opinion with a remarkable summation of dis-
satisfaction with the panel’s decision: “[T]he creation of a circuit split, the 
importance of the issue to the mutual fund industry, and the one-sided 
character of the panel’s analysis warrant our hearing the case en banc.”253  
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Because Posner knew at the time he wrote those words that such a re-
hearing was not going to happen for a lack of votes, one may reasonably 
suppose that he was directing his petition to a higher authority. 
Posner’s approach thus acknowledges the unique structure of mu-
tual funds and attempts to appreciate why mutual fund shareholders are 
unlike product buyers.  Indeed, his focus on the evidence of a problem in 
competition—the pricing disparity between institutional and retail inves-
tors—suggests a willingness to reject Easterbrook’s approach even on its 
own terms that assume shareholders are little more than buyers. 
D. Gallus v. Ameriprise Financial, Inc. 
A few months after Posner’s dissent and after the Supreme Court 
granted certiorari in Jones v. Harris Associates L.P., the Eighth Circuit 
handed down a remarkable opinion that opened an entirely new line of 
precedent in section 36(b) litigation.  In Gallus v. Ameriprise Financial, 
Inc.,254 the Eighth Circuit expressly disagreed with Easterbrook’s reason-
ing, endorsed Posner’s argument, and provided one template for the Su-
preme Court’s ultimate resolution of Jones.  In Gallus, a case with facts 
substantially similar to those in Jones, the Eighth Circuit could easily 
have stayed its decision pending the Supreme Court’s decision in Jones—
instead, the appeals court concluded that its opinion was important and 
ought to be heard in this debate.255  By handing down the first-ever deci-
sion in favor of a plaintiff in an excessive fees case,256 the Gallus court 
demonstrates that the judiciary has begun to balance unbounded deregu-
latory measures by adopting academic theories that call into doubt cer-
tain assumptions about the rationality of investors. 
The Eighth Circuit focused on the discrepancy noted by the plain-
tiffs in Gallus and Posner in Jones between the rates advisors charge in-
stitutional investors and the rates they charge ordinary investors.257  An 
important footnote in the Gartenberg decision suggested that such a 
comparison is permissible when possible, but advisors have long objected 
to any comparisons on the grounds that the investments are not readily 
comparable or that any variances are justified by the greater costs asso-
ciated with advising retail investors.258  The court in Gallus overrode 
these objections by pointing out that the retail and institutional funds 
here “had identical investment objectives and very similar stock hold-
ings”259 and that the advisor admitted in an internal e-mail that it pos-
sessed no good justification for the difference: “we should have a reply,” 
wrote an Ameriprise employee, “though it may or may not be convinc-
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ing.”260  Although Ameriprise ultimately produced a reply in the form of 
a report, the court questioned its “veracity and completeness.”261 
The investment advisor’s remaining defense, presumably adopted as 
a variant of the argument set forth by Easterbrook and soon to be re-
viewed by the Supreme Court, was “that an adviser cannot be liable for a 
breach of fiduciary duty as long as its fees are roughly in line with indus-
try norms.”262  The Eighth Circuit quickly dismissed that contention, not-
ing that “[t]o apply Gartenberg in this fashion across the entire mutual 
fund market would be to eviscerate § 36(b).”263 
In a compact but pointed opinion, the Eighth Circuit has left Gar-
tenberg largely undisturbed simply by expanding upon the single new fac-
tor identified by Posner (and minimized to a footnote in Gartenberg): 
whether the advisor can justify any discrepancies that exist between simi-
larly situated institutional and retail funds.264  Such a simple addition has 
shed dramatic new light onto this long-obscured field even though Gar-
tenberg itself has always contemplated such comparisons. 
III. A NEW JUDICIAL APPROACH 
In its present posture, the litigation regarding excessive fees 
presents an excellent opportunity both for regulators to consider appro-
priate new guidance for retirement investments and, more immediately, 
for the Supreme Court to resolve a dispute upon which turns the health 
of the nation’s investment industry.265  The linchpin of the arguments by 
Easterbrook, Posner, and the Eighth Circuit—and thus the key to the 
resolution of these cases—is the question whether the mutual fund indus-
try is indeed reasonably competitive.  In 1970, Congress concluded that it 
was structurally deficient, but in Jones, Easterbrook insisted that times 
have changed.266  With a more nuanced appreciation for the structure of 
the investment industry and the behavior of mutual fund shareholders, 
however, Posner’s dissent—which the Gallus court followed—offers the 
more illuminating guidance.  Easterbrook may have had the misfortune 
to publish his opinion immediately before a historic market collapse, but 
the Supreme Court now has the opportunity to incorporate the lessons of 
the recent market difficulties to deploy a behavioral approach to under-
standing the market dynamics of mutual funds. 
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Any thorough treatment of this doctrine must first address the con-
gressionally imposed fiduciary duty of section 36(b) and then assess the 
role and the effectiveness of market forces in supporting that duty. 
A. A Fiduciary Duty with Force 
Any argument that market forces are and ought to be the only re-
straints on the fees that investment advisors charge fund shareholders—
and that courts are ill-suited to this task267—must first acknowledge that 
Congress has already decided otherwise in its enactment of section 
36(b).268  In his opinion, Easterbrook attempted to minimize this duty, 
first by defining it down to a nullity and second by arguing that its mean-
ing must travel in concert with current understandings of the market.269  
The former approach involved the judicial elision of an inconvenient ob-
stacle; the latter is the retroactive substitution of a judge’s intent for what 
Congress desired.270  But if the duty is going to be read out of the statute 
in either manner, then it must be Congress who makes such a determina-
tion, preferably after seriously considering rigorous empirical and theo-
retical studies on both sides of the debate.271 
In the meantime, however, it seems clear that the force of section 
36(b)—which expressly applies “to the receipt of compensation for ser-
vices”272—deprives courts of the authority to disregard a congressionally 
enacted system of shareholder protections.  But even if the Supreme 
Court were to agree with Easterbrook and therefore minimize the cur-
rent relevance of section 36(b), a candid assessment of the retirement 
savings industry will nevertheless compel much more profound skepti-
cism of the presence and benefit of market forces. 
In the line of precedent that Easterbrook disapproved, other courts 
of appeals have closely examined the legislative history behind Con-
gress’s decision to create section 36(b).273  The Seventh Circuit, however, 
eschewed legislative history in favor of a solely textualist interpretation, 
albeit one in which Easterbrook disregarded an essential portion of the 
statute.274 
In two previous examinations of the Investment Company Act, the 
Supreme Court has recognized the legislative reasoning animating the 
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passage of section 36(b).275  Setting aside the debate over whether legisla-
tive history is appropriate in statutory interpretation, the aims of a sta-
tute can at times be self-evident.  The existence of the statute—such as 
section 36(b)—can, on its own, reveal the legislator’s desire to correct a 
problem.276 
The specificity of the phrase “with respect to the receipt of compen-
sation for services” strongly suggests that section 36(b) created a new 
kind of fiduciary duty beyond the simple avoidance of defrauding an in-
vestor, as Easterbrook suggested.277  Indeed, in his opinion, he offered no 
explanation of what work this phrase might be doing in the statute.  To 
reach the conclusion that Easterbrook did, that this provision means 
simply that “[a] fiduciary must make full disclosure and play no tricks,”278 
one must in essence eliminate all substance from the fiduciary duty. 
Certainly, as Justice Frankfurter has noted, the phrase “fiduciary 
duty” is a broad one capable of many different interpretations.279  But the 
presence of any duty whatsoever in section 36(b), imposed atop the 
preexisting regulatory scheme, suggests that this duty must be distinct 
and possess some, even if only modest, weight in cabining the advisory 
fees that investment fiduciaries may charge their investors. 
B. A More Rigorous Economic Analysis 
Even if one were to put aside the question of statutory interpreta-
tion, the most important issue in Easterbrook’s opinion is his interpreta-
tion of the competitive state of the mutual fund market.  But the cursory 
economic analysis that he advances is distressingly simplistic and, as 
Posner observed, “one-sided.”280 
As a procedural matter, appellate courts are not in the business of 
finding facts that exist outside of the record, so much of Easterbrook’s 
project of taking judicial notice of the state of the mutual fund market is 
superficial and unsubstantiated.  Indeed, his opinion is an illustration of 
why such fact-finding is discouraged at the appellate level without a trial 
court record.  Easterbrook simply does not sift the evidence.  Instead, he 
cites a single academic study—by Coates and Hubbard—and from it de-
duces the remainder of his findings.281 
In light of the complex idiosyncrasies of mutual funds, a court 
should be particularly cautious when evaluating this industry in the ab-
sence of a rigorous and balanced empirical data.  Several warning signs 
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should have given Easterbrook pause: the infamous regulatory investiga-
tions and massive settlements relating to market timing and late trad-
ing;282 the burgeoning literature raising doubts about the optimality of 
executive compensation;283 and the ongoing and dramatic collapse of oth-
er segments of the nation’s financial industry where, as Posner observed, 
“abuses have been rampant.”284 
A central challenge to the Coates-Hubbard study and, indeed, all 
claims of competitiveness in this industry is the presence of widespread 
price dispersion.  Wallison and Litan point out that different advisors 
charge widely disparate prices for similar services, across the breadth of 
actively managed funds and even across funds with identical investment 
strategies such as S&P 500 index funds.285  These findings challenge the 
economic law of one price: “that is, the prices of the collective invest-
ment services that mutual funds provide are not converging toward a 
common level, although convergence would be expected in a competitive 
market.”286  Although a certain amount of dispersion is not necessarily 
inconsistent with competition, the numbers in the mutual fund industry 
are remarkable, inasmuch as prices for shares in 811 actively managed 
equity funds “range from approximately 60 basis points to 170 basis 
points, or a difference in cost of almost 300 percent.”287  Coates and Hub-
bard hypothesize that these differences in price may be attributable to 
investors receiving something more when they pay more (such as mem-
bership in fund families with other, lower-priced funds that bring down 
the investors’ overall expenses)—but they do not offer any evidence of 
this phenomenon.  Supporting evidence would need to explain the many 
billions of dollars invested in those higher-priced funds and demonstrate 
the highly improbable claim that those investors do not invest in funds 
from multiple different advisors. 
Robert Litan, Joseph Mason, and Ian Ayres point out that price 
dispersion is not the only problem with the Coates-Hubbard study: nu-
merous studies demonstrate that fees are “correlated with negative mu-
tual fund performance.”288  And even in studies suggesting that certain 
superstar advisors may produce “superior performance at a few standout 
funds,” the authors of those studies nevertheless “acknowledge that, for 
the vast majority of funds, fees are not set in accordance with perfor-
mance.”289  Indeed, just weeks before the Supreme Court oral argument 
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in Jones, Javier Gil-Bazo and Pablo Ruiz-Verdú published a powerful 
study in the Journal of Finance demonstrating, once again, that perfor-
mance and price in mutual funds are inversely related—that is, as per-
formance increases, fund fees decrease, and as fees climb, performance 
drops.290  This finding, repeated many times over the past several dec-
ades, is profoundly incompatible with a competitive marketplace. 
Beyond his citation of Coates and Hubbard, Easterbrook offers os-
tensibly soothing data regarding the number of advisors, funds, and in-
vestments, but a closer analysis is necessary to adjudicate its healthy op-
eration.  Even in such a marketplace, competitive forces may not func-
tion effectively.  Contrary to Easterbrook’s assumption that “high fees 
drive investors away,”291 significant numbers of investors are not driven 
away.  As it happens, “many investors are not arriving to the agora unfet-
tered.”292  Their freedom to enter or to exit a particular fund is con-
strained subjectively by their inadequacies as investors and objectively by 
the limited array of choices available in many tax-advantaged accounts.293  
Again, contrary to Easterbrook’s assertion, it will do to contend that 
many of these investors are unsophisticated and incapable of making in-
formed decisions about how to invest their savings.294  Many of the 
aforementioned studies show that the investment field is varied and un-
even, with some funds competing on price vigorously while others oper-
ate largely without contest.295 
Easterbrook claimed that such unsophisticated investors as these 
will have their interests protected by sophisticated investors “who do 
shop” and thereby “create a competitive pressure that protects the 
rest.”296  This claim is true only if first, the number and assets of such so-
phisticated investors are sufficient to influence the advisors, and second, 
the sophisticated and unsophisticated investors operate within the same 
market space.  Easterbrook offers no support that the number and clout 
of the sophisticated investors is material.  And evidence directly contra-
dicts the assumption that the two species of investors are similarly si-
tuated.297 
In fact, the largest and most sophisticated investors in mutual funds 
do not actually hold the same securities as retail investors and they do 
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not pay the same fees.298  These institutions receive specially created ac-
counts or institutional shares, or Class I shares, that differ materially 
from the Class A, B, and C shares that average investors typically pur-
chase.299  Although institutional investors may be investing in separate 
accounts that are precise clones of the funds of average shareholders, 
they receive preferential and lower fees.300   
When sophisticated investors do pay advisory fees that are higher, 
they do not do so for the kinds of investments that average investors can 
access; instead, they pay such fees for private equity or hedge funds with 
radically different risk profiles.  While Easterbrook chose to compare 
unsophisticated and sophisticated investors when the fees were similar 
but the investment risks very different (by pointing out that institutions 
pay higher fees to invest in hedge funds than retail investors pay to invest 
in mutual funds), he refused to compare the two types of investors when 
the investment risks were identical but the fees very different (such as 
when institutional investors receive a deep discount over average share-
holders when they are all investing in the very same mutual fund).301  This 
contradiction hints at one solution that the Supreme Court could use to 
resolve Jones v. Harris Associates L.P., and that might in turn help to 
mend the broader operation of the retirement savings market. 
C. The Comparison of Retail and Institutional Fees 
In his dissent, Posner illuminated the proper path for the Supreme 
Court to take to produce an immediately beneficial effect on the savings 
industry.  Artificial doctrinal limitations (based largely upon misreadings 
of Gartenberg that ignore its third footnote) prevent plaintiffs from 
pointing out that institutional investors pay far lower fees than ordinary 
investors for the same funds and therefore may permit, in Posner’s 
words, the entire industry of “mutual fund advisers to charge exorbitant 
fees.”302  The Court should therefore allow and indeed encourage such 
comparisons.   
Investment advisors are quick to point out that there may be very 
good reasons why an advisor charges a large institution lower rates to in-
vest its money, such as economies of scale, lower administrative costs, 
and similar wholesale savings.303  Boards and courts should require advi-
sors to come forward with such evidence to justify broad discrepancies in 
the two sets of fees.  Because that information is almost entirely within 
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the control of advisors, they should carry the familiar common law bur-
den of demonstrating that their financial treatment of their fiduciaries is 
equitable.  Indeed, a rigorous regime of disclosing such data would allow 
investors, trustees, and courts to evaluate the quality and persuasiveness 
of such information.  But if such disclosure proves unconvincing, then 
there may indeed be such a thing as an excessive fee capable of redress 
by litigation pursuant to section 36(b).  To be sure, one wonders whether 
any or all of the Gartenberg factors provide as much probative weight as 
this single piece of information.  Requiring this information would both 
improve the efficacy of exit as a governance mechanism for mutual fund 
shareholders and simultaneously enhance transparency for buyers of mu-
tual fund investments in a product market.  With this simple doctrinal ex-
tension, mutual fund jurisprudence could thus invigorate both of its 
competing theoretical paradigms. 
The Supreme Court might also clarify the single point of agreement 
between Easterbrook and Posner in this matter, with respect to the ob-
servation that “[t]he Oakmark funds have grown more than the norm for 
comparable pools, which implies that Harris Associates has delivered 
value for money.”304  Posner, implicitly agreeing with Easterbrook, con-
ceded that this fact may mean that “[t]he outcome of this case may be 
correct.”305  But such a conclusion is warranted only if the growth of a 
fund necessarily implies the high performance of an advisor.  In fact, the 
advisors’ trade group notes that only forty percent of funds’ growth is ac-
countable to performance.306  The majority of remaining growth is due 
instead to sales—that is, new investors joining the fund.  Harris Asso-
ciates might be a poor portfolio manager but a wonderful marketer, 
which would generate significant fund growth but very little investment 
value.307 
In this case, the Supreme Court has an outstanding opportunity to 
endorse the more nuanced and sophisticated economic approach of 
Posner, which takes far greater account of the behavioral biases and dis-
tortions of investors.  And, at the same time, the Court can make great 
inroads at providing a far more rigorous analysis of an industry sorely in 
need of greater judicial and regulatory understanding.308 
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D. Practical Implications of a New Judicial Standard 
The range of likely doctrinal outcomes in Jones v. Harris Associates 
L.P. is relatively narrow.  The Supreme Court might adopt the Easter-
brook position at one extreme or simply reaffirm Gartenberg, though the 
practical effect of both approaches would simply be to perpetuate several 
more decades of plaintiff futility.  In effect, the Court would be endorsing 
an elaborate but toothless fiduciary analysis that has no independent 
force for checking advisors but that does impose compliance costs on 
shareholders.  At the other end of the narrow spectrum, the Court could 
establish a new standard focused upon the comparison of institutional 
and retail fees, either standing alone or as an additional factor to the ex-
isting Gartenberg litany.  The likely effect of such a “comparative” or 
“Gartenberg-plus” approach would be to discipline fees using a realistic 
judicial threat without undue costs. 
If investment advisors knew that they would be legally responsible 
for justifying discrepancies in the fees they charge institutions and indi-
viduals for the same services, they would confront a few options.  First, 
they could narrow the fee discrepancy, either by charging institutions 
more or charging individuals less.  Raising the prices on sophisticated 
and influential clients is clearly the more challenging of those two op-
tions, so lowering retail rates is more likely if there is any room to do so.   
Second, if there is no cushion in those retail rates, then advisors 
could alternatively publish the data that justify the additional costs they 
incur to service retail accounts.  Again, this process would provide great-
er transparency and information to the market, without requiring new 
SEC regulations.   
Third, advisors might cease to provide services to both institutional 
and retail clients or attempt a formalistic separation of its services into 
distinct legal advisors.  Such a dramatic withdrawal is unlikely in such a 
highly profitable industry; moreover, securities regulations have long 
dealt with indirect attempts to avoid jurisdiction.309 
Before one assumes that a new standard would automatically open 
the floodgates of litigation or lead to a slew of plaintiff victories,310 one 
must consider how section 36(b) litigation is conducted today.  To prove 
their compliance with the existing Gartenberg factors, defendant invest-
ment advisors have long deployed vast amounts of experts, data, and le-
gal expertise—indeed, they have never lost in a trial court.  The simple 
addition of one more factor—albeit a particularly probative and relevant 
one—does not necessarily mean that easy victories lie ahead. 
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Rather, the tone and force of a Supreme Court opinion, perhaps 
more than its doctrinal formulation, might ensure both prompt down-
ward pressure on artificially inflated fund fees and, consequently, evapo-
rate the pool of advisors vulnerable to potential lawsuits.  A decision 
with the rigor and skepticism of Posner’s dissent, more than the superfi-
ciality of previous rulings, might be the cheapest and yet most potent dis-
cipline for this market.  One might certainly debate whether courts are 
the ideal institutions to resolve these disputes, but with its enactment of 
section 36(b), Congress has already answered this question in the affir-
mative.  Detractors might prefer something more akin to a business 
judgment rule in which courts abstain from hearing fee disputes, but, 
again, Congress has already distinguished investment companies from 
typical corporations.  Inasmuch as the business judgment rule applies on-
ly when corporate decisions are free from conflicts,311 Congress appears 
to have concluded that the entire structure of mutual funds imbues this 
field with so much inherent conflict that the participation of courts is a 
necessary source of discipline. 
One important lesson from the recent financial debacle is that when 
private systems fail to work, the government faces an inexorable choice 
between allowing the systems to fail with unhappy results or intervening 
with taxpayer funds.312  One can easily anticipate that if vast swaths of the 
American public enter retirement with profoundly inadequate financial 
reserves, the government will once again be called upon to decide 
whether huge numbers of Americans are to be allowed to suffer destitu-
tion or if taxpayer funds should be used in a very expensive bailout.  Far 
better to intercede with a modest corrective measure now to help avert 
such unpleasant dilemmas in the future.313 
E. Theoretical Implications of a Supreme Court Ruling 
The debate between Easterbrook and Posner—now to be refereed 
by the highest court in the land—takes place at a fascinating moment in 
the broader theoretical debate over the influence of law and economics.  
The recent shocks to the global financial markets have prompted careful 
reconsiderations of deregulation.  Brian Tamanaha has documented a se-
ries of recent statements from Posner, Nobel laureate Gary Becker, and 
other erstwhile advocates of neoclassical law and economics that demon-
strate a reconsideration of their earlier positions.314  Indeed, Posner has 
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recently published a book discussing the recent market collapse in which 
he substantially revisits many of the central premises and implications of 
his earlier pronouncements on law and economics.315  With its ruling in 
Jones v. Harris Associates L.P., the Supreme Court will have an oppor-
tunity to contribute greatly to the richness of this debate and, if it choos-
es, to develop a behavioral economic framework that will shape econom-
ic and financial jurisprudence for decades to come.316 
Perhaps the central claim of neoclassical law and economics is that, 
as Easterbrook repeats in his opinion,317 no matter how poor or weak the 
results produced by the free market may be, alternatives—particularly 
those championed by governmental authorities—are sure to be worse.318  
Sunstein, Thaler, and now Posner, however, have pioneered a challenge 
to that orthodoxy and suggested, instead, that certain mild interventions 
may help the market find its way to a competitive equilibrium with more 
socially beneficial outcomes.319  The behavioralist approach is particularly 
compelling when the market in question may be far from free or compet-
itive, as the retirement savings industry appears to be.320 
When one contemplates how such interventions might take shape in 
the investment industry, abstract speculation is not necessary.  Indeed, 
much of the existing structure of tax-advantaged savings accounts was 
devised with clearly discernible paternalist goals in mind.321  Consider, for 
instance, that regulations prevent the owners of these accounts from 
withdrawing their money without incurring a substantial tax penalty until 
they reach the age of 59.5 years old.322  That structure is clearly intended 
to encourage participants to leave their funds invested and in place until 
the participants reach the age of retirement. 
More recently, the Pension Reform Act of 2006 removed previous 
legislation that required funds in these accounts to be parked in cash un-
less the account holder otherwise directed.323  Because the oversight of 
these accounts is so often neglected by employees who are busier work-
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ing for their retirement than managing their retirement assets, large 
amounts of assets previously sat uninvested for years on end, foregoing 
many of the proven benefits of long-term, compounded returns.324  Thus, 
today, accounts can be structured to place assets into relatively safe and 
cheap index funds.325  Here, then, are two existing instances of behavioral 
pragmatism already at work.  But the industry’s current state of confu-
sion on the section 36(b) issue demands the development of a more ro-
bust economic theory. 
A subsidiary but related economic issue concerns the theoretical 
debate regarding executive compensation.  In many respects, the fees 
that an advisor receives for the services that it performs for managing a 
mutual fund are akin to the compensation that executives receive for 
managing a conventional company.326  And, just as advisory fees are now 
a subject of scrutiny, academics and legislators have long directed their 
attention toward executive compensation.327  If anything, Jones v. Harris 
Associates L.P. presents the issue even more starkly: whereas executive 
compensation typically has an indirect and relatively minor effect, if any, 
upon the performance of a corporation’s stock, the impact of advisory 
fees upon an investor’s return is direct and immediate.328  Although 
claims of excessive executive compensation are typically debated only in 
Delaware courts,329 Jones presents an opportunity for the Supreme Court 
to expound upon an issue with unusually widespread popular and aca-
demic interest. 
Finally, this case presents an interesting opportunity for the Su-
preme Court to demonstrate its comfort and skill in evaluating dueling 
econometric analyses of market competitiveness.  To the extent the 
Court elects to pore closely over the competing claims of the studies by 
Gil-Bazo and Ruiz-Verdú, Coates and Hubbard, Wilson and Litan, Car-
hart, Malkiel, Sharpe, and others, the Justices have an opportunity to 
provide illuminating guidance for lower courts on how to interpret these 
complex methodologies, as well as for scholars on how to construct these 
studies most effectively. 
CONCLUSION 
During the troubling financial developments of the recent past, tril-
lions of dollars spilled quickly out of private retirement savings accounts.  
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The speed and magnitude of this collapse provides a painful but invalu-
able opportunity to pay greater attention to the structural vulnerabilities 
of our financial system in order to detect where the stress is greatest.  In 
the investment industry, which had already shown cracks over the past 
few years, the most profound weaknesses lie in the relationship between 
the advisor and the investor. 
While the neoclassical economic theory articulated by Chief Judge 
Easterbrook insists that the investment industry remains untroubled, the 
newfound behavioral approach of Judge Posner digs deeper to uncover 
and address these fundamental weaknesses.  In Jones v. Harris Associates 
L.P., the Supreme Court enjoys an exceptional opportunity to recalibrate 
the doctrinal and fiduciary standards of section 36(b).  More importantly, 
the Court can enrich a broad swath of economic jurisprudence with vi-
gorous new theory that takes greater and more reasonable account of the 
actual constraints on rational investor behavior and the painfully learned 
lessons born out of an uncurious reverence for deregulation. 
